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INTRODUCTION
For centuries the definition of fatherhood under American law
was simple: the mother's husband. A legal doctrine that originated in
English law called "the marital presumption" permitted courts to as-
sume that the mother's husband was both the child's functional and
biological father.' The policy rationales for the presumption were
that it protected children from the legal and social impacts of illegiti-
macy and preserved the sanctity of the perceived cornerstone of a
healthy society-a family consisting of a husband, wife, and children.2
The marital presumption also had some factual justification. For a
range of reasons, the number of children who were born to unmar-
ried parents in early twentieth century America was substantially lower
than it is today.3 Thus, the legal-i.e., married-father, the biological
father, and the functional father were, in fact, often the same person.
The dramatic shift in family composition over the last several de-
cades in the United States has made the marital presumption increas-
ingly inadequate as the sole definition of fatherhood under the law.
The United States government's 2000 census made clear that married
mothers and traditional families are on the decline. 4 The number of
women raising children in the United States without a husband grew
both in number and in percentage of total households in the last dec-
ade alone.5 Although divorce contributed significantly to this in-
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *457. The only recognized exceptions
were cases where a man was sterile or impotent, or outside the country. Id.
2 For a discussion of the privileged status accorded the marital or "unitary" fam-
ily in Anglo-American jurisprudence, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30
(1989). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 888 (1984) (discussing the role of natural law in the law's view of the nuclear
family as "the basic building block of this social order").
3 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
4 TAVIA SIMMONS & GRACE O'NEILL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAM-
ILIES: 2000, at 2-3, 7 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2
kbr0l-8.pdf.
5 Id. at 7. Nearly 25 million American children did not live with their fathers in
2000, compared with fewer than 10 million in 1960. William C. Smith, Dads Want
Their Day: Fathers Charge Legal Bias Toward Mons Hamstrings Them as Full-Time Parents,
89 A.B.A.J. 38, 40 (2003).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
LEGAL IMAGES OF FATHERHOOD
crease, the number of births to unmarried parents has also increased
dramatically in the last several decades.6 Only one quarter of Ameri-
can households now fit the traditional family model of married par-
ents and children. 7
The functional meaning of fatherhood has also changed signifi-
cantly over time. The common law conception of paternal functions
was expressed almost exclusively in economic terms. Although many
debate the extent of the change," most agree that men today are par-
ticipating more in family life than did their fathers. 9 The once clearly
defined role of mother as caregiver and father as breadwinner has
eroded. In addition to the changing demographic and social land-
scape, scientific advances from genetic testing to new reproductive
techniques have made defining fatherhood more complex.1 0
The law has made some attempt to refine its definition of father-
hood in the face of these changes. A series of United States Supreme
Court decisions, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois' in 1972, recognized
that unmarried fathers, linked by both biology and some measure of
involvement in a child's life, had both rights and responsibilities that
should be recognized under the law. The law has also given limited
6 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
7 SIMMONS & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 4 tbl.2.
8 ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND 131-32 (1997) (describing how
the idea of a "family man" retains a negative connotation in much of the corporate
world); see also MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY
POLITICS 102-18 (1999); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHiFr:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (describing the challenges
that face two working parent families); Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 181-86 (2000) (summarizing studies demonstrating that
mothers still assume a greater share of child caretaking); Naomi Gerstel, The Third
Shift: Gender and Care Work Outside the Home, 23 QUALITATRVE Soc. 467, 470-76 (2000);
Theresa Arendell, 'Soccer Moms' and the New Care Work (Berkeley Ctr. for Working Fam-
ilies, Working Paper No. 16, 2000) (discussing how fathers are more likely to work
more hours and spend less time with their children than mothers).
9 See generally KATHLEEN GERSON, No MAN'S LAND: MEN'S CHANGING COMMIT-
MENTS To FAMILY (1993) (examining the gender revolution's effects on American fa-
thers); NIctIoLAs W. TOWNSEND, THE PACKAGE DEAL: MARRIAGE, WORK, AND
FATHERHOOD IN MEN'S LIVES (2002) (describing the meaning of fatherhood in the
lives of American men).
10 See generally JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAw, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997) (examining the evolution of the nature and
concept of family in light of modern developments in reproductive technology); De-
velopments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, Changing Realities of Parenthood:
The Law's Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies,
116 HARV. L. REX'. 2052 (2003) (discussing the impact of social changes on
parenthood as a legal status).
11 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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recognition to men who have served as "social" or "functional" fathers
but were neither married to their child's mother when the child was
born nor biologically connected to the child. 12 More recently, there
have been policy and legislative efforts designed to strengthen and
facilitate the bonds between children and their fathers. 13 While many
of these new policies are designed to encourage fatherhood within
marriage, 14 many policymakers have come to recognize the impor-
tance of creating social and economic supports for unmarried fathers
to foster continuing paternal involvement in children's lives. 1
5
While these developments have fostered a broader and more
multi-dimensional legal conception of fatherhood, a series of recent
12 See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Dana Milbank, A Marriage of Family and Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
2001, at Al; see also Deb Price, Fatherhood Defines Bush Pick, DETROIT NEWS, June 17,
2001, at 13A (describing President Bush's choice of Wade Horn to oversee the na-
tion's change in the welfare system by shifting its focus more to dads).
14 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), provided federal funding to states to promote the formation
and maintenance of marriage as well as the reduction of out-of-wedlock pregnancies.
THEODORA OOMS ET AL., BEYOND MARRIAGE LICENSES: EFFORTS IN STATES To
STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE AND Two PARENT FAMILIES 5 (2004), available at www.clasp.
org/publications/beyond-marr.pdf. PRWORA included "illegitimacy bonuses,"
funding made available to the top five states to reduce the rate of births to unmarried
parents with no increase in abortion rates. DORIAN SOLOT & MARSHALL MILLER, LET
THEM EAT WEDDING RINGS: THE ROLE OF MARRIAGE PROMOTION IN WELFARE REFORM 4
(2002), available at http://www.unmarried.org/rings.pdf. Other state marriage pro-
motion programs funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
include a program in West Virginia, where families receiving TANF benefits are
awarded a $100 bonus if the family is headed by a legally married couple. Marriage on
the Public Policy Agenda: What Do Policy Makers Need To Know From Research?, POVERTY
RES. INSIGHTS (Nat'l Poverty Ctr., Univ. of Mich., Ann Arbor, Mich.), Winter 2004, at
1, 4. Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin are also using TANF funds to promote
marriage through "marriage handbooks" and media campaigns. SOLOT & MILLER,
supra, at 3. In 2005, the Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act of
2005, H.R. 240, 109th Cong., was introduced in the House to strengthen PRWORA.
The Senate Finance Committee approved the Personal Responsibility and Individual
Development for Everyone Act (PRIDE), S. 667, 109th Cong. (2005), sending it to the
full Senate for consideration. Both H.R. 240 and S. 667 incorporate funding for pro-
moting marriage and provide funds of $100 million annually for activities like public
advertising campaigns on the value of marriage, marriage education and skills pro-
grams for unmarried expectant parents, skills training for married couples, and di-
vorce reduction programs. Both bills also provide an additional $100 million for
"research, demonstrations and technical assistance." H.R. 240, 109th Cong. (2005);
S. 667, 109th Cong. (2005).
15 See, e.g., Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, There Must Be 50 Ways To Start a
Family, in THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 83, 83-104 (Wade F. Horn et al. eds., 1999).
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judicial decisions and legislative enactments around the country
threaten to push fatherhood back into a narrow box. The once lim-
ited definition of fatherhood based on marriage is now being replaced
by an equally limited definition based on biology. This new definition
of fatherhood has developed in the context of a series of cases in
which men have assumed the role of father in children's lives and
later, often after many years, seek genetic testing in order to be re-
lieved of the legal obligations of fatherhood. 16  While such
"delegitamizing" of children would not be permitted under rules es-
tablishing fatherhood based on marriage or caretaking, these defini-
tions of fatherhood are being increasingly rejected in favor of a single
criteria for fatherhood based on biology. Over the last several years,
many states have adopted policies by judicial decision or statute that
relieve men of their legal status as fathers if genetic testing excludes
them on biological grounds. 17 As a result, children are becoming fa-
therless and losing the emotional connection, companionship, nur-
turing, and economic support that fathers can provide.
This emerging definition of fatherhood based solely on biology
has not developed to serve either of the traditional goals of family law:
protecting children and preserving family stability.1 8 Rather, this
trend appears to be one of the unintended consequences of three
decades of federal and state legislation designed to reform the na-
tion's welfare system.' 9 These policies were crafted to reduce welfare
costs and improve conditions for custodial mothers and children
through more vigorous establishment of paternity and collection of
child support.20 These policies have had mixed results in meeting
those goals. At the same time, applied most aggressively against low-
income fathers of children receiving public benefits, welfare-driven
child support policies are pushing those fathers to seek disestablish-
16 See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
18 CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW
153-54, 157-61 (1996) (describing two of the functions of family law as protecting
vulnerable family members and supporting the social institutions of marriage and
family).
19 See infra Part II.A.
20 See infra Part II.A. Throughout this Article, I refer to custodial parents as
mothers and noncustodial parents/child support obligors as fathers. While the num-
ber of single fathers who serve as custodians for children is increasing, the vast major-
ity of children in single parent families are in single mother households. SIMMONS &
O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 2-3; see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood:
Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 688, 708 (1998) ("[M]others overwhelmingly are the custodians and caretakers
of children .....
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ment of paternity. In resolving these claims, courts and legislatures
are reinstating a construct of paternal functions defined almost exclu-
sively in economic terms and a definition of fatherhood grounded in
biology that ignores other potential bases for fatherhood-based care-
taking.2 1 As a result, children are becoming fatherless and the state's
interests in collecting child support, preserving families, and protect-
ing children are undermined by the very laws designed to protect
those interests.
The connections between welfare reform and the legal construct
of fatherhood are complex and have not been fully explored.2 2 They
have, however, profound implications for the future of children and
families. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the law's historical ap-
proach to defining fatherhood. Part II explores the connection be-
tween the evolving definition of fatherhood based exclusively on
biology and developments over the last three decades in welfare and
child support law.2 3 The Article concludes with some preliminary sug-
gestions for shaping policies that balance the need for appropriate
21 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
22 Much scholarship analyzing the changes in child support in the early 1990s,
including the author's, focused on how to make the new child support bureaucracy
more effective in collecting support. SeeJane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretion-
ary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 226-31
(1991) (arguing that the move from discretion to rule-based child support guidelines
with enhanced enforcement is a much needed reform); Marsha Garrison, Child Sup-
port and Children's Poverty, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 479-81 (1994) (book review) (detailing
how inefficiencies in child support collection contribute to child poverty rates). But a
few scholars and researchers saw the risks of unintended consequences of the new
directions in welfare and child support policy as early as a decade ago. David L.
Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support Enforce-
ment, 81 VA. L. REv. 2575, 2577 (1995) (discussing a suspicion "that although im-
proved enforcement programs would likely produce substantial positive results for
many women and children, they would also, for a substantial and immeasurable num-
ber of men, women and children, inflict unintended and undesirable harms that we
would regret. As is often true in our society, these negative consequences would be
borne disproportionately by the poorest persons and by persons of color"); Sara S.
McLanahan, The Consequences of Single Motherhood, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1994, at 48,
57 (recognizing the risks of "stricter" child support enforcement on the poor).
23 In this section and elsewhere in this Article, I use the terms "child support
reform" and "welfare reform" interchangeably. This reflects the fact that since the
early 1970s child support collection has been strongly linked to the goal of reducing
welfare costs. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L.
REv. 229, 254 (1999) ("The history of child support law represents a literal joining of
family law and welfare law. The original federal child support program was limited to
families receiving [welfare] because, quite simply, the government wanted to recoup
welfare costs through child support collections.").
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child support enforcement with the overarching goal of keeping fa-
thers in children's lives.
I. HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS OF FATHERHOOD
The law's definition of fatherhood has evolved over time. The
common law principle that fatherhood would only be recognized
within marriage remained the law until the late twentieth century
when the law began to recognize unmarried fathers based on biology,
caretaking or both. This modern expanded definition of fatherhood
has been challenged by developments in the law in the last decade. As
welfare costs have soared, the federal government has increased its
powers to recover these costs from putative fathers, particularly low-
income men, through aggressive paternity establishment and child
support enforcement policies. In response, these men have sought to
defend against incarceration and other sanctions for failing to pay
child support by questioning the legitimacy of paternity orders estab-
lished without genetic testing. The state legislatures and courts have
answered these paternity disestablishment efforts by reverting to a nar-
row definition of fatherhood which is based solely on biology and
which limits fathers' role under the law to that of breadwinner. This
shift, based on flawed assumptions about the value of linking child
support and welfare, has dramatic and negative implications for fami-
lies, especially children.
A. Fathers as Husbands: The Marital Presumption
The presumption that the husband of a married woman is the
father of any children born to that woman was a fundamental princi-
ple at common law.2 4 Dating back to Roman law, the presumption
was conclusive unless the husband was sterile, impotent, or had no
access to his wife during the relevant time period prior to birth. 25
Non-access could only be proven by testimony from third parties2"
that "the husband be out of the kingdom of England ... for above
24 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *457.
25 NICHOLAS HARRIS NiciioLAs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ADULTERINE BASTARDY
I (London, William Pickering 1836).
26 This rule of evidence provided that neither the husband nor the wife could be
a witness to prove access or non-access where the effect of such testimony would result
in the illegitimacy of a child. This rule is generally referred to as Lord Mansfield's
rule. HOMER CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 398
(1968). Lord Mansfield described the evidentiary conclusion as "a rule, founded in
decency, morality, and policy, that [the husband and wife] shall not be permitted to
say after marriage .. .that the offspring is spurious." Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98
Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.).
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nine months."27 The marital presumption remained "one of the
strongest presumptions known to law" in eighteenth and nineteenth
century England and America.28
There are two principle policy justifications for the marital pre-
sumption. The first is the need to protect children from the stigma
and legal disabilities resulting from illegitimacy.29 An illegitimate
child was considered to be no one's child.30 This social stigma was
reinforced by prevailing religious and legal principles that held that
"all progeny . . . not begotten" in a marriage were unlawful.31 The
child of unmarried parents had no right of inheritance or succes-
sion.32 Unmarried biological fathers had neither an obligation to pay
child support nor custodial rights to their children. 33 Thus, when
mothers died or were unable to care for their children, nonmarital
children often became wards of the state.
The marital presumption was also justified as necessary to protect
the sanctity of the most protected unit under Anglo-American family
law: the marital family.34 By preventing the possibility that either
27 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *457 (describing the four seas or extra quatuor
maria doctrine).
28 See, e.g., Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App. 1988).
29 This policy justification may be viewed as somewhat circular given that the ra-
tionale for the legal disabilities suffered by children deemed "illegitimate" was to pro-
tect the sanctity of marriage and punish the immorality of parents who gave birth
outside of marriage. Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REV.
22, 37 (1902).
30 MARTHA T. ZINGO & KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST NoN-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1994); see also HARRY D.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971) ("In common law, the illegiti-
mate was filius nullius, no one's son-no more, but no less.").
31 WILFRED HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 3 (1911). Social stigma from ille-
gitimacy may have been greater in the United States than England due to the reign of
William the Conqueror, "who made no effort to disguise his illegitimate origin and
frequently referred to himself as William the Bastard." Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Father-
hood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585,
588 (1991).
32 JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 175 (New York, 0. Halsted
1827).
33 While no legal support claim could be brought for these children under the
common law, ecclesiastical courts might hold biological fathers responsible for the
economic support of their illegitimate children. See generally R.H. Helmholz, Support
Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63
VA. L. REV. 431 (1977) (arguing that although the common law of English state courts
neglected to provide support for illegitimate children, ecclesiastical courts provided a
useful mechanism for providing these children with support).
34 See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 201-02 (1985); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving
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spouse would testify to establish a third party had fathered a child with
the wife, the "peace and tranquility of states and families" were pre-
served3 5 As discussed in an eighteenth century English case, "It is a
rule founded in decency, morality and policy that [the husband and
wife] shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have had
no connection and therefore that the offspring is spurious; more espe-
cially the mother who is the offending party.
3 6
The common law rules on fatherhood also reflected the view that
"the father-child relationship was primarily an economic one." 37 The
rights and responsibilities that attached to legal-i.e. marital-fathers
were primarily economic in nature. Married fathers had an obligation
to provide financial support and children of married fathers could
inherit from them. In turn, marital children were viewed as property
and fathers were entitled to their labor, and after the Industrial
Revolution, to the earnings of their children.""
B. Unmarried and "De Facto" Fathers: Adding Biology and Caretaking as
Alternative Bases for Fatherhood
In practice, then, the marital presumption limited legal fathers to
married men. If a child's mother was married, her husband, with few
exceptions, was viewed as the father. If a child was born to an unmar-
ried woman, the child had no father. 39 In either circumstance, un-
married biological fathers were not recognized under the law. This
rigid system that narrowly defined fatherhood by marital status began
to change as the social, demographic and scientific supports for the
system eroded. First, the numbers of nonmarital births in this country
increased dramatically in the last three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury.40 At the same time, the legal distinction between legitimate and
the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y
& L. 505, 519-33 (1998) (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court's position
on the marital presumption).
35 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (quotingJ. SCHOULER, LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 225, at 306 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company 1882)).
36 Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.).
37 Kisthardt, supra note 31, at 588; see also James Kent, Commentaries on American
Law (describing parents' legal obligations to provide economically for their chil-
dren), reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 363
(Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970).
38 See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038, 1064-68 (1979).
39 Biological fathers had no right of action at common law to bring a paternity
suit. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 14 N.W. 718, 719 (Wis. 1883).
40 The rapid growth in the illegitimacy rate did not begin until 1970 when it went
from eight percent of births in 1970 to thirty-two percent in 1992. Gertrude Himmel-
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illegitimate children began to be stricken from the law on constitu-
tional grounds. 41 Finally, science's ability to determine biological fa-
therhood improved dramatically.42 All of these circumstances led to
two developments in the last half of the twentieth century that re-
sulted in the expansion of both the legal definition of father and the
perceived functions of fatherhood: (1) a weakening of the marital pre-
sumption; and (2) a recognition that unmarried biological fathers
have constitutionally protected relationships with their children.
While marriage continues to play an important role in defining
fatherhood, the marital presumption has weakened in the last quarter
farb, A De-Moralized Society: The British/American Experience, PUB. INT., Sept. 22, 1994, at
57, 59. The nonmarital birth rate has remained relatively stable since 1990. CHILD
TRENDS, FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (2003), available at www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG
2003.pdf. When illegitimacy rates are broken down by race, the picture is somewhat
different. For white children the ratio went up from 1.5% to a little over two percent
between 1920 and 1960, and then advanced at an even steeper rate than that of
blacks: to almost six percent in 1970, eleven percent in 1980, and nearly twenty-two
percent in 1991. The black illegitimacy ratio did not accelerate as much because it
started at a higher level: from twelve percent in 1920 to twenty-two percent in 1960,
over thirty-seven percent in 1970, fifty-five percent in 1980, and sixty-eight percent by
1991. Id. at 3-4; see also NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, COUNTING COUPLES: IMPROVING MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE, AND COHABITATION DATA IN THE FEDERAL STATISTICAL
SYSTEM (2001), available at http://childstats.ed.gov/americaschildren/pdf/counting
couples/ccr.pdf (providing highlights from the National Institute of Health National
Workshop December 13-14, 2001); Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To
Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709, 736-42 (1996) (discussing the
cultural and legal impediments to formal marriage among both African Americans
and poor white populations in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries).
41 CLARK, supra note 26, at 155-72.
42 Two common paternity tests are human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing
paternity testing and DNA fingerprinting. See Deborah A. Ellingboe, Sex, Lies, and
Genetic Tests: Challenging the Marital Presumption of Paternity Under the Minnesota Parent-
age Act, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1015 n.12 (1994). Although invasive HLA tissue typing
can provide up to ninety-eight percent probability of paternity, see id., buccal swab
DNA testing has become the most common method of determining paternity due to
its noninvasiveness and convenience. Who Can Collect a Buccal Swab?, FORENSIC PATER-
NITY TESTING NEWSL. (Divorcenet.com), Apr. 2003, http://wwwl.divorcenet.com/
newsletter03/fptn008.html. Swab testing, which does not require lab technicians to
collect, is available through home test kits provided by online services with turn-
around times as minimal as three to five days for costs ranging from $205-$440.
SwabTest.com, Fee Schedule, http://www.swabtest.com/fee.php (last visited Sept. 8,
2005). Legal DNA testing, due to the necessary chain of custody, requires collection
by appointment at a testing facility, such as Gene Tree. Gene Tree DNA Testing
Center, DNA Paternity Testing for Legal Purposes, http://www.genetree.com/prod-
uct/dna-legal-tests.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
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century. 43 Although the nature of the evidence necessary to rebut the
presumption varies widely, putative unmarried fathers can become
"legal" fathers in a number of states by presenting evidence of both
the biologic connection to the child and the extent of the relationship
they have established with the child.44
Other changes in the law resulting in legal recognition based on
both biology and caretaking functions have been grounded in consti-
tutional protections for unmarried fathers. In a series of decisions
beginning in the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court recognized
(1) the fathers of nonmarital children have legal rights and (2) the
functions of fatherhood go beyond economic support.45
In the 1972 decision Stanley v. Illinois,46 the United States Su-
preme Court considered the rights of Peter Stanley, who had lived
with Joan Stanley and their children in an unmarried relationship for
eighteen years. When Joan Stanley died, Illinois, like most states at
that time, did not recognize Stanley as the father and the children
were declared wards of the state and placed in the custody of guardi-
ans. In holding that Illinois's statute violated both the guarantees of
due process and equal protection, the Court found that Stanley's bio-
logical and caretaking commitment to his children entitled him to be
recognized as their father under the law. 47 The Court further held
that because unmarried fathers have a "private interest" in their con-
tinued relationship with children they had "sired and raised," the state
must afford them an opportunity to establish their fitness prior to the
children's removal. 48
43 See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Pre-
sumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 566-71 (2000); Traci Dallas, Note, Rebut-
ting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 374
(1988). A sharply divided United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a strong marital presumption statute in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989). A few years later, however, California joined the majority trend and amended
and weakened its marital presumption statute. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7611 (West Supp.
2005).
44 The marital presumption can now be challenged in many states by the mother,
husband, or the child. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West Supp. 2004); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.01 (West
Supp. 2005). But such challenges are often unsuccessful when subjected to a "best
interests of the child" test. See In re Marriage of Wendy M., 962 P.2d 130, 132 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1998).
45 John A. Bluth, Can an Unmarried Biological Father Recover Damages?, 2002 Utah
L. Rev. 577, 578-82.
46 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
47 Id. at 658.
48 Id. at 651-53.
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Three decisions following Stanley reaffirmed the principle that an
unmarried biological father's efforts to establish a relationship with
his children-both as financial provider and nurturer-determine
whether the law recognizes him as father. In the 1978 case Quilloin v.
Walcott,4 9 the Supreme Court held that a putative father who had not
attempted to establish a relationship with his eleven-year-old child
could not prevent the child's adoption by the mother's husband when
that adoption was in the best interests of the child.50 A year later, in
Caban v. Mohammed,51 the Court reaffirmed the connection between
establishing an ongoing relationship with one's children and legal rec-
ognition of fatherhood. 52 The Court invalidated a New York statute
on equal protection grounds that precluded an unmarried father
from adopting his biological children. In so doing, the Court held
that there must be an "established . .. substantial relationship" be-
tween the unmarried father and the child in order for the father to
exercise his rights.5 3
Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson,54 the Supreme Court found that
states can impose a time limitation for a putative father to establish a
relationship with his nonmarital child.55 The majority resisted the
dissent's position that the biological connection itself was enough to
create the legally protected status as father. 56 Instead, the majority
held that "[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it of-
fers the natural father an opportunity ... to develop a relationship with
his offspring."57
49 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
50 Id. at 254.
51 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
52 Id. at 392-94.
53 Id. at 393.
54 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
55 Id. at 262-65.
56 Justice White wrote a dissent in Lehrwhich was joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun. It was their position that the "biological connection" is itself a relationship
that creates a protected interest.
Thus the "nature" of the interest is the parent-child relationship; how
well developed that relationship has become goes to its "weight," not its "na-
ture." Whether Lehr's interest is entitled to constitutional protection does
not entail a searching inquiry into the quality of the relationship but a sim-
ple determination of the fact that the relationship exists-a fact that even
the majority agrees must be assumed to be established.
Id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 262 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also Laura Oren, The Para-
dox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology 'Plus' Defines Relationships; Biology
Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 47, 50-70 (2004) (dis-
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These developments in the law-the weakening of the marital
presumption and the recognition of the importance of caretaking in
Stanley and its progeny-resulted in the emergence of an expanded
legal definition of fatherhood. Marriage to the child's mother, a bio-
logical connection, and an established relationship were all recog-
nized as important elements in establishing legal fatherhood. Not all
were required elements of fatherhood, but all were recognized as po-
tential bases for establishing legal fatherhood. By expanding the cate-
gory of men who could be legally recognized as fathers, the law also
began to support an expanded conception of the functions of father-
hood that goes beyond economic support and includes the important
functions connected with nurturing and caring for children's day-to-
day needs. This re-envisioning of fatherhood has been strengthened
by other developments in family law that reflect recognition of the
importance of the child caretaking function of fatherhood.
In the area of custody, one of the first developments of this kind
was the introduction of the concept of joint custody. The first joint
custody statute was passed in 1979 in California, 58 and most states
eventually followed suit, either by joint custody statutes or through
case law.59 While many scholars have critiqued the implementation of
cussing the Supreme Court's constitutional view of nonmarital fathers' personal rela-
tionships with their children).
58 Stephanie N. Barnes, Strengthening the Father-Child Relationship Through a.]oint
Custody Presumption, 35 WILLAMETE L. REV 601, 611-14 (1999).
59 About forty-one states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing
courts to order joint or shared custody. Of these forty-one, twenty-nine authorize the
court to order joint custody but do not require it. ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(a) (Lexis-
Nexis 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.1(A)
(Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(b) (1) (A) (ii) (Supp. 2003); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 722, 727
(1999); IAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.1 (LexisNexis 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/602.1(b) (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (West 1999); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (2000); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203(d) (LexisNexis 2004); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 208, § 31
(LexisNexis 2003); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.375 (West Supp. 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(5) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-4 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAr. § 50-13.2 (2003); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.04(A) (2) (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(B) (West 2001);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.105(a) (West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304 (West
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-5-7.1 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(1)
(Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (Supp. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 665(a) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-
207(a) (LexisNexis 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2005). Twelve states and the
District of Columbia have some form of presumption in favor of joint custody. CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 2004); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-914(a) (2) (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (b) (2) (West
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joint custody statutes, 60 the enactment of such statutes reflects a legal
recognition of fathers' roles as caretakers of their children.
Another development over the last decade that has promoted in-
volvement of fathers in children's lives when parents live apart is the
growing use of court-ordered "parenting classes" in custody cases. 61
"Parenting plans" emphasize the importance of both parents in care-
taking of children by requiring the parties to delineate each parent's
responsibilities for the care of the children and decisions about educa-
tion, health care, and discipline. 62 About thirteen states currently re-
quire parties to submit proposed parenting plans prior to a grant of
custody.63 Another nine states and the District of Columbia have stat-
Supp. 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(a) (4) (Supp. 2004), amended by S. 7, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005), available
at http://www.kslegislature.org/legsrv-bills/shwBill.do?id=38833; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(D)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)
(West Supp. 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (West Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 125.490 (LexisNexis 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (LexisNexis Supp.
2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4049.1 (LexisNexis 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)
(West Supp. 2004). Nine states do not have statutes but can orderjoint custody under
the courts' general equitable powers. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (2004); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-717 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (2003); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(McKinney Supp. 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-
16 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152 (Vernon
2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.002 (West 2005).
60 See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's Joint Custody Presump-
tion: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 767 (1997) (arguing
in favor of resolving custody issues through agreements made by parents, rather than
by the imposition of joint custody by courts); Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A
Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207-16 (1998) (arguing that studies
supporting joint custody are misleading because research tools are flawed and the
ultimate success of ajoint custody arrangement depends on cooperation between the
parents).
61 See Debra A. Clement, 1998 Nationwide Survey of the Legal Status of Parent Educa-
tion, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 219, app. (1999) (providing brief program
descriptions of parent education programs in each state); see also Special Issue, Parent
Education in Divorce and Separation, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 9 (1996).
62 See Don R. Ash, Bridge over Troubled Water: Adoption and Custody Law in Tennessee,
27 U. MEM. L. REv. 769, 804-05 (1997); Francis J. Cantania, Jr., Learning from the
Process of Decision: The Parenting Plan, 2001 BYU L. REv. 857 (2001).
63 ALA. CODE § 30-3-153 (LexisNexis 1998) (requiring parents in joint custody
cases to submit a plan regarding the care and custody of the child); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-403.02(A) (Supp. 2005) (requiring that parents must submit a proposed
parenting plan before a court awards joint custody); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
602.1(b) (West 1999) (providing that in cases where a court considers an award of
joint custody, the court requests that the parents produce a joint parenting agree-
ment specifying each parent's powers, rights, and responsibilities regarding the
child); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (LexisNexis 2003) ("At the trial on the merits, if
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utes that give judges discretion to require parenting plans in custody
cases.
64
... either party seeks shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or individu-
ally, shall submit . . . a shared custody implementation plan."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.375(b) (9) (West Supp. 2005) ("Any judgment providing for custody shall in-
clude a specific written parenting plan setting forth the terms of such parenting plan
arrangements .... Such plan may be a parenting plan submitted by the parties ... or,
in the absence thereof, a plan determined by the court ... the custody plan approved
and ordered by the court shall be in the court's discretion and shall be in the best
interest of the child."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (2003) ("In every dissolution
proceeding, proceeding for declaration of invalidity of marriage, parenting plan pro-
ceeding, or legal separation proceeding that involves a child, each parent or both
parents jointly shall submit.., a proposed final plan for parenting the child .... );
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (F) (LexisNexis 1999) (stating that prior to the award of
joint custody, a court shall approve a parenting plan-including division of child's
time and care between parents-for the implementation of the custody arrange-
ment); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(G) (LexisNexis 2003) ("If a pleading or mo-
tion requesting shared parenting is filed, the parent or parents filing the pleading or
motion also shall file with the court a plan for the exercise of shared parenting by
both parents."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(C) (West 2001) ("If either or both
parents have requested joint custody, said parents shall file with the court their plans
for the exercise of joint care, custody, and control of their child."); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.102(1) (West 2003) ("In any proceeding to establish or modify ajudgment
providing for parenting time with a child ... there shall be developed and filed with
the court a parenting plan to be included in the judgment."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-10.8 (Supp. 2005) (stating that in any divorce proceeding, any party requesting cus-
tody shall file a proposed parenting plan); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West
2005) ("In any proceeding ... each party shall file and serve a proposed permanent
parenting plan."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(lm) (West Supp. 2004) (providing that
in any action in which legal custody or physical placement is contested, a party seek-
ing custody or physical placement shall file a parenting plan with the court).
64 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a) (1) (West 2004) (providing the court with discretion
to require parties to submit a plan for the implementation of the custody order);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(7) (West 2005) (stating that in allocating parental
responsibilities, both parties may submit parenting plan(s) for the court's approval
that shall address both parenting time and the allocation of decisionmaking responsi-
bilities, and if no parenting plan is submitted or if the court does not approve a sub-
mitted plan, the court shall formulate a plan); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (LexisNexis
2005) ("In any custody proceeding under this chapter, the Court may order each
parent to submit a detailed parenting plan which shall delineate each parent's posi-
tion with respect to the scheduling and allocation of rights and responsibilities that
will best serve the interest of the minor child or children."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1607(a) (Supp. 2004) (stating that a court may require mediation between the parties
in order to develop a parenting plan); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West Supp. 2005)
(stating that if both parties agree to use a parenting plan, but cannot agree on the
terms, the court may order one and may require the parties to submit proposed
parenting plans); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364(1) (2004) ("When dissolution of a mar-
riage or legal separation is decreed, the court may include a parenting plan devel-
oped under the Parenting Act .... ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(e) (West 2002) (stating
20051
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
A new standard for resolving custody disputes proposed by a
group of academics, judges, and lawyers from the American Law Insti-
tute (ALl) has also contributed to an expanded definition of father-
hood that, in some instances, places caretaking on the same level as
marriage and biology in establishing parental rights. 65 The ALl pro-
poses a substantive standard for custody that limits the court's ability
to resort to parental stereotypes, shifting the paradigm in custody
cases from parents to children.66 Instead of asking which parent has
deviated from the prescribed role,67 the new approach states that a
child's best interest is served by "continuity of existing parent-child
attachments" and giving responsibility to "adults who love the child,
know how to provide for the child's needs, and place a high priority
on doing so. ''68
A number of scholars have also made the case for legal recogni-
tion of "de facto" parents by challenging the law's adherence to the
concept of exclusive parenthood based on marriage or biology.69
Katharine Bartlett, one of the first to advocate for "non-exclusive
that the court may require each party to submit a custody plan in cases in which the
parties cannot agree); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-403 (2001) (stating that a temporary
parenting plan shall be incorporated in any temporary order of the court in actions
for absolute divorce, legal separation, annulment, or separate maintenance involving
a child, and if the parties cannot agree to one, the court may require each party to
submit a proposed temporary parenting plan); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.007
(Vernon 2002) (stating that if the court finds that the parenting agreement reached
by the parties is not in the best interests of the child, it may require the parties to
submit a revised agreement); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201 (LexisNexis 2004) (stating
that if the parents agree to one or more provisions of a parenting plan, the court shall
so order unless it is not voluntary or it would be harmful to the child, but if an agree-
ment is not accepted by the court, it shall allow the parties to negotiate another
agreement).
65 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
66 The ALI Principles use terms "custodial" and "decisionmaking responsibility"
rather than physical and legal custody. Id. § 2.03(3)-(4).
67 For a review of child custody cases in which courts relied on the father as
breadwinner and mother as nurturer stereotypes, see Murphy, supra note 20, at
696-99.
68 ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 65, § 2.02(1) (b), (d); see Murphy, supra note 20, at
695-96; see also NANCY E. DowD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 4-13 (2000) (arguing for a
legal definition of fatherhood based upon nurture rather than biology or marriage).
69 An early explanation of the importance of the de facto or psychological parent
is found in the landmark work of psychologists Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and
Alfred Solnit:
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based
thus on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences.
The role can be fulfilled either-by a biological parent or by an adoptive
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parenthood," argues that when the nuclear family has broken down,
children should have "the opportunity to maintain important familial
relationships with more than one parent or set of parents ... in the
growing range of circumstances in which these relationships are
formed outside the nuclear family."70 Other scholars have argued for
a more expansive view of non-exclusive parenthood, advocating for a
"rewriting of the definition of the family." 71 Under these proposals,
the law's recognition of adults who have assumed one or more paren-
tal roles is not predicated on the breakdown of the child's parents'
marriage. These scholars reject the privileged status of the nuclear
family, finding it insufficient to meet the needs of children. 72 Instead,
these proposals envision broader, more fluid family networks, that
one scholar has called "webs of care."73
While these proposals for non-exclusive parenthood vary in the
criteria that would be deemed sufficient to trigger legal recognition of
caretakers, they all place caring for the child as the condition for such
recognition. Thus, they replace biology and, in most instances, mar-
riage, with a functional definition of parenthood. They offer a theo-
parent or by any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult,
whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973).
70 Bartlett, supra note 2, at 882-83; see also William C. Duncan, Don't Ever Take a
Fence Down: The Functional Definition of Family-Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L.
& FnM. STUD. 57 (2001) (advocating a functional view of family based on relationships
that fulfill the functions of marriage and parenting and where the relationships are
defined according to the family members' emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Per-
spective on Parental Rights, 14 CARwozo L. REV. 1747, 1751-59 (1993) (arguing that the
biological mother's unmarried partner who cared for mother and child throughout
pregnancy and early childhood should be given legal parental status).
71 Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-
Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 143 (2004); see also Leslie Joan Harris,
Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 480 (arguing that
the basis for granting of parental rights and duties should be the sustained perform-
ance of the functions of parenthood); Gilbert Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitu-
tional Right of Children To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L.
REv. 358, 410 (1994) (calling for recognition of the child's independent interest in
continuing a child-parent relationship through visitation regardless of the adult's bio-
logical relationship with the child); Young, supra note 34, at 554 (calling for recogni-
tion of the contributions made by the community in the upbringing of a child and
claiming that the "paradigm of the exclusive family has outlived its value").
72 Kavanagh, supra note 71, at 93; Young, supra note 34, at 512-13.
73 Kavanagh, supra note 71, at 141; see also Young, supra note 34, at 515-18.
While recognizing the need for placing decisionmaking authority for children in a
"core family unit," these proposals recognize that parental roles may be allocated
among several adults and argue that the law should recognize multiple caretakers.
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retical framework that appropriately challenges the "all or nothing"
biology-based definition of fatherhood emerging from the paternity
disestablishment cases.
The work of scholars arguing against exclusive parenthood is also
reflected in the ALI Principles, which accord legal protection to "so-
cial" or "functional" fathers and others similarly situated.7 4 In addi-
tion to legal parents, the ALI recognizes parents "by estoppel." A
parent by estoppel is a person who acts as a parent in circumstances
that would estop the child's legal parent from denying the claimant's
parental status. Parent-by-estoppel status is created when an individ-
ual: (1) is obligated for child support; (2) has lived with the child for
at least two years and has a reasonable belief that he is the father; or
(3) has had an agreement with the child's legal parent since birth (or
for at least two years) to serve as a co-parent, provided that recogni-
tion of parental status would serve the child's best interest.75 Both
legal parents and parents by estoppel are entitled to presumptive allo-
cations of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility.7 6
Building on the work of researchers and scholars, legislatures and
judges have also begun to recognize "functional" parents when decid-
ing custody and visitation cases. Over the last three decades, a few
states77 and a number of courts78 have granted nonbiological,
74 The ALI, courts, and legislatures use a variety of terms to describe an individ-
ual who has, based on caretaking over a period of time, formed a strong bond with a
child. The terms include "de facto," "social," "functional," or "psychological" parent.
While these terms may have slightly different meanings attributed by different schol-
ars or courts, they are used interchangeably throughout this Article. See ALI PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 65, § 2.18.
75 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 65, § 2.03(1) (b).
76 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 65, § 2.09(2). The ALI Principles also recognize "de
facto parents." Under the ALI analysis, a de facto parent is a person, other than a
legal parent or parent by estoppel, who has regularly performed an equal or greater
share of caretaking as the parent with whom the child primarily lived; lived with the
child for a significant period (not less than two years); and acted as a parent for non-
financial reasons (and with the agreement of a legal parent) or as a result of a com-
plete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions. See id.
§ 2.03(1) (c). While a de facto parent may acquire some parental rights, the ALI Prin-
ciples still privilege the legal parent's rights over the de facto parent's. A de facto
parent is precluded from receiving a majority of custodial responsibility for the child
if a legal parent or a parent by estoppel is fit and willing to care for the child, unless
the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not been performing a reasonable share of
parenting functions or the available alternatives would cause harm to the child. See
id. § 2.18(1) (a). Similarly, a de facto parent's rights may be limited or denied if the
custodial allocation would be impractical in light of the number of other adults to be
allocated custodial responsibility. See id. § 2.18(1) (b).
77 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West 2001) (granting rights to "a per-
son who establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship or ongoing per-
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nonmarital caretakers such as stepfathers or partners in same-sex rela-
tionships rights similar to those granted to legal fathers. While most
of these statutes and decisions continue to distinguish between legal
parents and third parties, they are a step toward recognition of social
fatherhood in that rights are accorded based on the adult's caretaking
relationship to the child rather than the adult's biological status. 79 As
one leading family court trial judge commented:
sonal relationship"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 2003) (granting rights to a
person who "maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship").
78 Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982) (finding that the legislature
intended to allow third party visitation and that where a stepparent is in loco parentis, a
stepchild is considered a "child of the marriage"); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d
666, 670-71 (Cal. 2005) (holding that children born to same sex couple can have two
mothers, both of whom have custody rights and support obligations); A.G. v. D.W.,
No. B175367, 2005 WL 1432744, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2005) (deciding that
former same sex partner had standing to seek visitation under Uniform Parentage
Act); Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2000) (granting visitation rights to
former stepparent); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (granting visitation to the
lesbian co-parent of twins but denying joint custody); Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (granting partial custody and visitation rights to nonbiological
father who was married to child's mother and assumed the role of child's father for
eight years); In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing a
common law claim of "de facto or psychological parentage" for former same-sex part-
ners and their right to visitation), cert. granted, 101 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2004); In re Cus-
tody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (holding that where a nonbiological
adult proves she has a parent-like relationship with a child, a court may grant visita-
tion if it is in the best interests of the child). While these cases generally limit the
parental rights to visitation, some courts have extended custodial rights or standing to
seek such rights to de facto parents. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004) (awarding joint custody to mother's same sex partner because of the parent-
child bond and the emotional harm to the child, should that parental tie be broken);
P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (affirming trial court's
grant of custody to neighbor over aunt because neighbor was psychological parent);
R.E.M. v. S.L.V., No. FD-15-748-98N (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 2, 1998) (awarding
nonbiological mother both visitation and joint legal custody); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682
A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that a functional parent may have
standing to seek partial custody of biological child of former lesbian partner if she can
establish that she stood in loco parentis to child during relationship); In re Clifford K.,
No. 31855, 2005 WL 1431514, at *1 (W. Va. June 17, 2005) (holding that a deceased
mother's lesbian partner has standing to seek custody of the child born during their
relationship because she is a psychological parent); see also Robyn Cheryl Miller, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights for Non-Biological "Parents ": Analyzing V.C. v. M.J.B., N.J.
LAw. MAC., Feb. 2001, at 17 (discussing an attorney's thoughts on her participation in
V.C. v. M.JB).
79 The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000), endorsing the common law tradition of autonomy for legal parents,
may be seen as evidence of a trend in the opposite direction. However, the Troxel
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Biology is not always determinative of a man's role in the life of a
child. When I examine the ultimate issue of what is in the child's
best interest, I have found that a biological connection is not neces-
sarily required for a paternal link to grow between the man and the
child. At the same time, while there may be a biological tie, biology
alone does not make a good father.80
Thus, by the late twentieth century, the law had begun to recog-
nize men as fathers based on marriage, biology, caretaking, or some
combination of these. These legal developments supported a view
that fathers have a rich, complex role in their children's lives. This
role includes not only financial support but also the emotional and
physical support that comes from ongoing connection and care.
II. FATHERHOOD AS BIOLOGY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT: THE IMPACT
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND WELFARE REFORM
ON FATHERHOOD
A: Child Support and Welfare Reform
Against a backdrop of laws expanding the view of fatherhood,
welfare and related child support policies have pushed the law in the
opposite direction. Three decades of welfare "reform" have resulted
in policies that threaten to limit the meaning of fatherhood to biology
and financial support. While the primary goal of modern child sup-
port law was to reduce welfare costs,8 1 many hoped that improved
child support collection would reduce poverty in low-income custodial
households.8 2 These efforts, however, have had a number of unin-
tended consequences that have adversely impacted low-income fami-
lies, particularly the relationship between fathers and children in
those families.
Court clearly supported continued legal recognition of nonparents based on their
assumption of caretaking duties for the children. Id. at 64.
80 Sharon S. Townsend, Fatherhood: A Judicial Perspective, Unmarried Fathers and the
Changing Role of the Family Court, 41 FAm. CT. REV. 354, 354 (2003).
81 See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Moving Beyond the Child Support Revolution, 26 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 505, 505 (2001) ("Much of the motivation for the enormous national
effort and expense devoted to the child support revolution was the promise that bet-
ter support enforcement would help keep single-parent families off the welfare rolls
and allow the government to recoup its growing expenditures for public benefits.");
see also Brito, supra note 23, at 250-51, 259; Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 510 (1987-1988) (describing the 1974 Act as "explicidy
sold on the basis of reducing welfare costs and caseloads").
82 See supra note 22.
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The connection between legal recognition of fatherhood and
welfare law begins with the requirement that custodial parents-over-
whelmingly mothers-seeking public benefits for their children must
identify the fathers of those children.8 3 The principle that noncus-
todial parents should reimburse the state for its costs in supporting
their children has been in place since the beginning of the child sup-
port "revolution" in the mid-1970s.84 In 1974, Congress enacted Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act which created the Child Support En-
forcement Act and established the Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement.8 5 The Act required welfare recipients to assign their
rights to child support to the state8 6 to offset welfare costs of the fed-
eral government. Because identifying the noncustodial parent is the
initial step in child support enforcement,87 welfare recipients were re-
quired to cooperate in identifying the noncustodial parent.88
83 The overwhelming majority of children who live with only one parent live with
their mothers. See JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 7 (2004). This Article, therefore, follows the rhetoric
and reality of welfare "reform" in assuming the named welfare recipient is a mother
caring for children and the child support obligor who the state looks to for reim-
bursement is the father.
84 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 763
(1998) (describing child support enforcement techniques as having "undergone a
revolution in recent decades as a result of federal involvement"). For a complete
history of the "federalization" of child support, see Naomi Cahn &Jane Murphy, Col-
lecting Child Support: A Histoiy of Federal and State Initiatives, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 165
(2000).
85 Social Services Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101 (a), 88 Stat.
2337, 2351-58 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The
Act created a partnership between federal and state government wherein each state
administered child support enforcement programs under the direction of federal pol-
icy and was reimbursed for a portion of the enforcement expenditures. ELAINE SOR-
ENSEN & MARK TURNER, NAT'L CTR. ON FATHERS & FAMILIES, BARRIERS IN CHILI)
SUPPORT POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (1995), available at http://www.ncoff.
gse.upenn.edu/litrev/sb-litrev.pdf.
86 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (A) (1975) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3)
(2000)).
87 E. Wattenberg, Paternity Actions and Young Fathers, in YOUNG UNWED FATIHERS:
CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 213, 216-17 (Robert I. Lerman & Theodora
J. Ooms eds., 1993).
88 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2000) (requiring that, as a condition for receiving
child support, a parent must provide the name "and such other information as the
State agency may require" with respect to the noncustodial parent) (corresponds to
§ 101 (c) (5) (C), 88 Stat. at 2359-60).
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In response to exceedingly low child support collection 89 and a
belief that a "lack of a strong child support enforcement system con-
tributed to child poverty and welfare dependency," 90 Congress en-
acted more rigorous enforcement tools in the Child Support
Enforcement Amendments of 1984.91 This statute required that states
create fixed formulae for establishing the level of child support and
impose sanctions, such as income withholding, for child support obli-
gors who fail to comply with child support orders.9 2
Four years later, Congress passed the Family Support Act of
1988,9 3 which marked the real beginning of the focus on paternity
establishment as the cornerstone of the modern child support and
welfare system.9 4 Prior to this federal legislation, the state was rela-
tively uninvolved in the establishment of paternity, leaving the resolu-
tion of the issue to parents.9 5 This Act required that each state
establish a minimum number of paternity declarations or face finan-
cial penalties. 96 The Act also allowed for, but did not require, genetic
testing in contested paternity cases 97 and imposed time limits for
states to process paternity cases.9 8
89 The average child support award in 1983 was $2521. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 148, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1983
(SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT) 10 tbl.G (1986). A conservative estimate of annual expendi-
tures that could have been expected to be made on behalf of two children in a two-
parent, medium income family in 1983 was $10,028. THOMASJ. ESPENSHADE, INVEST-
ING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL EXPENDITURES 3 (1984) (analyzing Es-
penshade's 1981 estimates updated to 1983 dollars using the Consumer Price Index).
90 SORENSEN & TURNER, supra note 85, at 2.
91 Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a), 98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 667(a) (2000)).
92 See id.
93 Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
94 "[Paternity establishment] may be considered the foundation of the [Child
Support Enforcement] program. To improve the lives of children, one of [the] ma-
jor goals is to increase paternity establishment rates for those children born outside of
marriage." Oversight of the Child Support Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 9 (1999) (state-
ment of Honorable Olivia A. Golden, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.).
95 Prior to the federal push, paternity was established for only one-third of
nonmarital children born each year. Brito, supra note 23, at 259.
96 42 U.S.C. § 652(g) (2000) (corresponds to § 11l(a), 102 Stat. at 2348-49);
Daniel R. Meyer, Paternity and Public Policy, in 1 PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT: A PUBLIC
POLICY CONFERENCE 3 (1992).
97 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (B) (i) (corresponds to § 11(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 2349).
98 Id. § 652(h) (corresponds to § 121(a), 102 Stat. at 2351).
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Congress continued the push to increase and streamline pater-
nity establishment when it enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993. 99 Noting that the "first step in securing child
support is the establishment of paternity," 100 the Act mandated,
among other things, that states develop a simple administrative pro-
cess for a "hospital-based program for the voluntary acknowledgement
of paternity."101 More aggressive performance standards for establish-
ing paternity were also included in the 1993 statute. 10 2
In 1996, Congress launched its most comprehensive effort "to
end welfare as we know it,"10 3 and enacted the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) .104
This law affects nearly every aspect of child support services, particu-
larly paternity establishment. To further facilitate paternity establish-
ment, the Act requires states to permit paternity establishment at any
time before a child is eighteen years old. 10 5 States were again man-
dated to simplify the process for voluntary paternity acknowledgment,
such as by enacting programs based in hospitals and other designated
sites. 10 6 States also risk federal penalties unless they meet the ultimate
goal of paternity establishment in ninety percent of welfare cases
statewide. 107
Under PRWORA, the state is only required to provide genetic
testing upon request and in certain contested cases. 10 8 To further en-
courage paternity establishment, the Act strengthened the "coopera-
tion requirement" in which a mother seeking public assistance must
99 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 31.
100 Charlotte L. Allen, Federalization of Child Support: Twenty Years and Counting, 73
MICH. Bus. L.J. 660, 661 (1994).
101 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (C) (ii) (corresponds to § 13721(b) (2), 107 Stat. at 659).
102 Compare § 111 (a), 102 Stat. at 2348-49, with § 13721(a), 107 Stat. at 658 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 652 (g)).
103 Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al. PRWORA was soundly criticized by advocates for the
poor for its caps on eligibility for benefits. See Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill
Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43-45 (criticizing PRWORA
based on its effects on low-income single mothers and their children). The emphasis
on streamlining paternity establishment, however, was largely ignored. Paul Legler,
The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 519, 526 n.42 (1996).
104 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
105 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (corresponds to § 331(a), 110 Stat. at 2227).
106 See id.
107 Id. § 65 2(g) (corresponds to § 341(c), 110 Stat. at 2232).
108 Id. § 666(a) (5) (B) (i) (corresponds to § 331(a), 110 Stat. at 2227).
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aid in identifying the father of the child.1 0 9 Failure of women to coop-
erate in identifying putative fathers without a showing of good cause
will result in a reduction of benefits or a complete denial of assis-
tance. 110 These policies were further strengthened by federal legisla-
tion in 1998"' that provided significant monetary incentives to states
to maximize paternity establishment." 2
PRWORA also strengthened a variety of sanctions for nonpay-
ment of child support that had been enacted in previous legislation.
These included income withholding, state and federal income tax re-
fund intercept, and revocation of professional motor vehicle and rec-
reational licenses.' 1 3 While the imposition of sanctions had
traditionally been dependent upon judicial findings after a hearing,
PRWORA made the imposition of most sanctions automatic. 114
109 Id. § 608(a) (2) (corresponds to § 103(a), 110 Stat. at 2135). Good cause may
be shown where naming a putative father may result in violence against the mother
and/or child. Other circumstances such as rape, incest, artificial insemination, and
single parent adoption may result in a good cause showing. However, where the
mother may simply not want assistance from the father or the father's involvement,
the state will generally demand such involvement when there is a request for state
assistance. See Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement,
8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 668 (2000). See generally Anna Marie Smith,
The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002) (listing the bonuses and sanctions that PRWORA
employs to compel states to ensure maternal cooperation in the establishment of
paternity).
110 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (corresponds to § 103(a), 110 Stat. at 2135). The Act
specifies that applicants for TANF assistance and Medicaid must assign support fights,
including distribution, to the state and cooperate in establishing paternity. The state
must deduct a minimum of twenty-five percent from a family's cash assistance grant,
and may end the family's eligibility for grants altogether, for "non-cooperation" in
establishing paternity, or if a child support order is modified or unenforced without
good cause. Additionally, if the federal government finds that states are not enforc-
ing non-cooperation sanctions against individuals, the state will be penalized up to
five percent of the TANF block grant for the next fiscal year. Candice Hoke, State
Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality, and a Federalism-Based
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 115, 117 (1998).
111 Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200,
112 Stat. 645 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
112 42 U.S.C. § 658a (corresponds to § 201(a), 112 Stat. at 648-56).
113 For a summary of sanctions added by child support legislation in the 1980s and
90s, see generally Cahn & Murphy, supra note 84, at 165; see also Deadbeat Parents
Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618, 618-19 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 228(c)) (increasing penalties under the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992
from misdemeanor to felony).
114 42 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1) (corresponds to § 325(a) (2), sec. 2, § 228(c), 110 Stat. at
2224).
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The federal system, then, has established a framework for pater-
nity establishment for men identified by custodial mothers seeking
public benefits through two principal methods."15 Under the most
common method, 16 parents can sign a voluntary paternity acknowl-
edgement in the hospital, the birth record agency, or other desig-
nated site. 1 7  No paternity order is issued. After sixty days, the
acknowledgement itself is the legal finding of paternity and is entitled
to full faith and credit in other states.' 18 Although the acknowledge-
ments must contain a statement of the legal consequences of signing
the documents, there is no requirement that counseling or genetic
testing be offered or conducted before the acknowledgement is
signed and becomes legally binding.' 19
115 The third method of establishing legal paternity is through marriage. If the
parents marry anytime before the birth of the child, the baby will be considered to be
the legal child of the mother's husband. If the parents marry after the child's birth
and the husband publicly acknowledges the child as his, there is a presumption that
the husband is the legal father. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
116 Nationally, according to the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE), paternity was established or acknowledged for over 1.5 million children in
fiscal year 2003, the last year for which data is currently available. Of these, 662,500
were the result of legal actions and almost 862,000 were through the voluntary ac-
knowledgment process. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP"T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2003 PRELIMINARY DATA
REPORT tbl.2 (2004), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/
2004/reports/preliminarydata/table_2.html. In some states, the percentage of pa-
ternity establishments through voluntary acknowledgment has been particularly high.
In Massachusetts, for example, seventy-sevent percent of fathers voluntarily acknowl-
edge paternity in the hospital. Wefare Reform: Building on Success: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 53, at *2 (2002) (statement of Marilyn Ray Smith,
Deputy Comm'r and IV-D Dir., Child Support Enforcement Div., Mass. Dep't of Reve-
nue) (LEXIS, Testimony Library, Fed. Doc. Clearing House Cong. Testimony). The
voluntary paternity process was used for 74.74% of unmarried births in New Jersey to
establish paternity in 1997. Oversight of the Child Support Enforcement Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 73
(1999) (statement of Alisha Griffin, Assistant Dir., NJ. Div. of Family Dev.).
117 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C). In some states, voluntary acknowledgment is per-
mitted at a wide variety of sites including community centers, health centers, and
preschool programs. The law gives states the option to allow voluntary acknowledg-
ment at sites other than hospitals and birth records agencies if they use the same
forms and materials. 45 C.F.R § 302.70(a) (5) (iii) (B), (C) (2004).
118 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (C) (iv).
119 Id. § 666 (a) (5) (C) (i) (I). Federal law does require that the acknowledgement
form meet certain requirements. Id. § 666(a) (5) (C) (iv). Action Transmittal 98-02
sets forth those requirements. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACTION TRANSMITTAL OCSE-AT-98-02 (1998), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/AT/at-9802.htm. They include current
name, social security number, and date of birth of the mother and the father; current
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The second method of establishing paternity is through a judicial
proceeding typically initiated by the state after the mother applies for
welfare and identifies someone as the putative father. 120 Although the
child support agency must make genetic testing available and can or-
der the tests without court supervision, 121 there is no federal require-
ment that genetic tests be conducted before paternity is established by
this method either. In most cases these court based paternity pro-
ceedings are resolved by consent or default without genetic testing.122
After the consent or default, the court enters an order and usually sets
child support at the same time. 23 In contested cases of paternity, fed-
eral law has also streamlined the adjudication process in court and
administrative proceedings in a variety of ways, including eliminating
the right to ajury trial.124
B. From "Deadbeat" and "Duped" Dads to "Dead Broke" and
"Disappearing" Dads
Over the last three decades, then, both the federal and state gov-
ernments have constructed massive bureaucracies focused on making
noncustodial parents-mostly low-income fathers-pay child support.
This "revolution" in child support was, for the most part, enthusiasti-
cally received by many scholars and policymakers, particularly advo-
cates for women and children. 125 The goals of "legalizing" the father-
child relationship for more children of unmarried parents and in-
creasing and enforcing court-ordered child support for all children in
single parent households held the promise of reducing child poverty.
Thirty years later, however, it is time to reexamine the underlying as-
full name, date of birth, and birthplace of the child; a brief explanation of the legal
significance of the document; a statement that either parent can rescind within sixty
days; a clear statement that the parents understand that signing is voluntary and what
the rights, responsibilities, and consequences of signing are; and signature lines for
the parents and witnesses/notaries. Id.
120 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5)(B) (ii) (I), (a) (5) (F) (iii), (c) (1) (A).
122 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
123 42 U.S.C. § 666. Neither the acknowledgement process nor judicial proceed-
ings establishing paternity typically provide an opportunity to address visitation or
other noneconomic issues related to developing a relationship between the newly rec-
ognized father and the child. Instead they are focused exclusively on establishing the
legal basis for child support orders. Daniel Hatcher & Hannah Liebermann, Breaking
the Cycle of Defeat for "Deadbroke" Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support
Issues, 37J. POVERTY L. & POL'y 5, 8 n.19 (2003).
124 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5).
125 See supra note 22.
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sumptions driving these reforms as well as the impact of these reforms
on low-income families.
1. The Flawed Assumptions Underlying Child Support and Welfare
Policy
a. Child Support and Child Poverty
The first assumption that needs to be reexamined is that the en-
hanced child support enforcement scheme is critical to putting food
in the mouths of children in poor families. 126 While there has been
some success in improving child support collection, 127 the child sup-
port regime has largely failed to reduce child poverty.1 2 3 There is
some evidence that the receipt of child support may be important for
non-welfare custodial households. 129 But the same research shows
that aggressive child support enforcement has not reduced poverty for
welfare families. 130 The reasons for this are multifaceted but not par-
ticularly complex. First, there has been limited success in obtaining
child support orders for never married mothers, the population most
likely to be receiving welfare benefits.131 Even for those children who
have support orders, custodial mothers receiving welfare obtain no
126 Juliet Eilperin, House Bill Targets Deadbeat Parents, WASH. POST, May 13, 1998, at
A10 (stating that one effect of potential child support enforcement law would be a
reduction in child poverty); Cokie Roberts & Steven Roberts, Going After Those Dead-
beat Dads at the Federal Level, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 1, 1997, at B7 (re-
porting Congressman Henry Hyde's statement in support of aggressive child support
enforcement that "[a] lot of little kids are undergoing economic child abuse").
127 PAUL LEGLER, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-INCOME FATHERS AND CHILD SUP-
PORT: STARTING OFF ON THE RIGHT TRACK 6 (2003) [hereinafter CASEY STUDY]
(describing that child support collections increased from $8 billion in 1992 to $18
billion in 2000).
128 J. Thomas Oldham, Preface to CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER iX, iX-Xiii
(J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds., 2000) (summarizing recent research on
the impact of child support reforms and finding "there is considerable evidence that
reforms have failed to accomplish one of the most important objectives of child sup-
port, that of reducing child poverty").
129 KRISTINE WITKOWSKI, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, How MUCH CAN
CHILD SUPPORT PROVIDE? WELFARE, FAMILY INCOME AND CHILD SUPPORT 6 (1999) (find-
ing that for many non-welfare low-income families, child support contributes to a
lower poverty rate but child support does not have the same effect on single-mother
families receiving welfare).
130 See id.
131 ELAINE SORENSEN & HELEN OLIVER, THE URBAN INST., CHILD SUPPORT REFORMS
IN PRWORA: INITIAL IMPACTS 16-17 (2002). In 1999, 39.8% of never-married
mothers had a child support order, compared with 57.9% of divorced or separated
mothers, and 63.6% of currently married mothers. Id. In addition, for never-married
mothers who had a support order, 55.6% received some portion of ordered support,
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benefit unless the support paid exceeds their welfare benefits. As
noted earlier, under the child support distribution scheme for fami-
lies on welfare, the custodial parent assigns her right to support and
the state retains support paid by noncustodial parents as reimburse-
ment for welfare benefits. 13 2 Thus, the ever-increasing resources de-
voted to collect child support from low-income fathers have no direct
impact on the financial well being of children on welfare.
In addition to the structural issues in welfare law that redirect
child support from families to the state, the desperate economic cir-
cumstances of most fathers of children on welfare 133 almost ensures
the failure of the child support system to effectively address child pov-
erty. As Marsha Garrison writes:
Child support policy can avert poverty only if that poverty derives
from an income loss associated with family dissolution or nonforma-
tion. If parents lack the resources to avoid poverty when together,
child support alone cannot remedy the problem .... Because most
poor children do not have "deadbeat dads" who can contribute sig-
nificantly to their support, child support policy will offer the most
help to the least needy: it cannot be expected to achieve a major
reduction in children's poverty.13 4
compared to 71.1% and 72.2% for divorced or separated mothers and currently mar-
ried mothers, respectively. Id.
132 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Experts estimate that "approxi-
mately 50 percent of all child-support debt-which is $90 billion on a national level-
is owed to the government." Ann W. Parks, One Dad's Dilemma, DAILY REc. (Md.),
Apr. 1, 2005, at lB.
133 See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
134 Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policies, in CHILD SuP-
PORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 128, at 16, 22, 24-25 (citations omitted); see also
JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESHEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY.
WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 223 (1991) (detailing how early critics of welfare policy
concluded child support enforcement efforts would have little impact on poor fami-
lies because of low earnings of poor fathers). Although beyond the scope of this
Article, a number of promising proposals have been made to reduce child poverty by
guaranteeing children a minimum level of income that is not linked to the amount of
child support collected from their parents and is guaranteed through the child's mi-
nority without regard to parents' work choices or eligibility for welfare. See, e.g.,
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2003) (arguing
that poor children can only gain autonomy if there is an equalization of resources
such that a floor is created below which no one is allowed to fall); Stephen D.
Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2523 (1995) (proposing a system of child support assistance for children in one-
parent households to be run by Social Security).
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Thus, the shift of focus for support of children from entitlement to
public benefits to making fathers pay did not signal a positive change
for the financial well being of children.
b. Low-Income Fathers and the "Deadbeat" Stereotype
A related assumption that needs to be reexamined is that the low-
income fathers who are the target of aggressive enforcement are all
"deadbeats." 135 The image of the "Deadbeat Dad" is well entrenched
in American culture. 136 It evokes an image of a noncustodial father
who has impoverished his children while improving his own standard
of living after separation from the family.137 Media coverage 18 and
political rhetoric 139 paint a picture of a father, usually divorced, who is
middle-aged, middle class, and ignoring his children's needs while en-
joying a prosperous lifestyle. As one commentator has noted:
[T]he public's anger has spread to all noncustodial fathers owing
support. These fathers have emerged as the new villains in our cul-
ture. "The irresponsibility of fathers takes three forms: they bring
135 Daniel Borunda, Roundup Nabs Alleged Deadbeat Dad, EL PASO TIMES, June 20,
2003, at 4B; Robert E. Pierre, States Consider Laws Against Paternity Fraud; Child Advo-
cates Worry About Effects, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at A3; Carlos Sadovi, Dragnet Out
for Deadbeat Dads, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 14, 2003, at 1.
136 See sources cited supra note 135.
137 See generally LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPEcrED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323
(1985) (finding that female and child poverty increase after divorce, creating an over-
whelming gap in the standard of living for divorced men compared to that of their
children and ex-wives);James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster
of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987) (citing studies conducted in
California, Ohio, and Vermont that indicate a grim economic outlook for women in
the years following divorce).
138 Joe Mahoney, Deadbeats in N.Y. Owe Kids $3B, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), June 30,
2000, at 5 (discussing New York's challenges in collecting child support from non-
paying fathers who hide income by working off the books, moving to states lax in
child support enforcement, and putting assets in others' names); Pay for Kids or Pay the
Price, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at B8 (discussing the arrest of several parents with
significant child support arrearages, including a doctor with a six figure income who
owed $86,000 and a disbarred lawyer who writes software who also owed $86,000);
Robert Pear, U.S. Agents Arrest Dozens of Fathers in Support Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2002, at Al (discussing the arrest of a professional football player who makes approxi-
mately $1.1 million per year and owes $101,000, a Texas engineering company em-
ployee who owes $264,000, and a psychiatrist who owes $64,976).
139 See supra note 126; see also Ronald B. Mincy & ElaineJ. Sorensen, Deadbeats and
Turnips in Child Support Reform, 17 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 44, 48 (1998) (distin-
guishing between fathers who could pay child support but do not and fathers who
lack the means to provide meaningful support and calling for policy changes that
distinguish between the two groups).
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into the world 'illegitimate' children they do not intend to support;
they leave marriages they should remain in; and, whether married
or not, they fail to pay support for the children they leave behind."
It would not be an exaggeration to say that politicians of all stripes
have taken up a moral crusade against nonsupporting fathers, con-
demning their immorality and selfishness. 140
While these stereotypical "deadbeats" exist, many of the men ow-
ing child support are in fact dead broke. 141 Researchers estimate that
as many as 33.2% of young, noncustodial fathers are unable to pay
child support due to poverty. 142 Many low-income fathers have sub-
standard education, lack marketable skills, and often have criminal
histories that hinder employment. 143 Many are minors, without
strong family support.' 44 Many are substance abusers or have mental
or physical disabilities which can contribute to economic and family
instability. 145 They are often immigrants for whom English is a second
140 Brito, supra note 23, at 264 (citing Chambers, supra note 22, at 2576).
141 In Baltimore, where I directed a family law clinical program from 1989-2003
that included a paternity and child support practice, most of the noncustodial parents
in state-initiated child support proceedings are young, poorly educated African-Amer-
ican males with little work experience. See Robert J. Rhudy & Joe Surkiewicz, Dead
Broke, Not Deadbeat: Child Support System Hurts Children, Families, DAILY REc. (Md.), July
18, 2003, at 7B (noting that more than eighty-four percent of noncustodial parents in
Baltimore do not have the income to pay child support).
142 Mincy & Sorensen, supra note 139, at 47.
143 PAUL OFFNER & HARRY HOLZER, THE BROOKINGS INST., LEFT BEHIND IN THE LA-
BOR MARKET: RECENT EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AMONG YOUNG BLACK MEN 4 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/publications/offnerholzer.
pdf (finding that nationally, the employment rate for black men in central cities in
1999 and 2000 was 46.99%, compared to 53.24% in metropolitan areas overall and
63.09% in the suburbs); see also ELAINE SORENSEN, THE URBAN INST., OBLIGATING
DADS: HELPING LOW-INCOME NONCUSTODIAL FATHERS Do MORE FOR THEIR CHILDREN 1
(1999), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/sL2.pdf (noting that low-
income fathers who do not pay child support tend to be "young and disproportion-
ately African-American, with limited education"); ELAINE SORENSEN & CHAVA ZIBMAN,
THE URBAN INST., POOR DADS WHO DON'T PAY CHILD SUPPORT: DEADBEATS OR DIsAD-
VANTAGED? 2 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf b30.pdf
(finding that forty-three percent of poor nonresident fathers who do not pay child
support lack a high school diploma or equivalent).
144 PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, No MINOR MATTER: DEVELOPING
A COHERENT POLICY ON PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT FOR CHILDREN BoRN TO UNDERAGE
PARENTS 1 (2004), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/nominor_brf.pdf
(finding that there are "roughly 150,000 babies born each year to unwed parents at
least one of whom is a minor [typically under 18]").
145 WENDELL PRIMUS & KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS, THE ABELL FOUND., IMPROVING CHILD
WELL-BEING BY FOCUSING ON LOW-INCOME NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS IN MARYLAND 3,
24-25 (2000), available at http://www.abell.org/pubsitems/cd-improving-child_900.
pdf.
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language.146 All of these circumstances have created a substantial
group of noncustodial fathers who are subject to child support obliga-
tions they are simply unable to meet. Unlike the stereotypical "dead-
beat" who can respond to sanctions with payments, these fathers will
accrue large arrears, be subject to sanctions, and fall further into the
cycle of poverty.
2. The Impact
A number of child support establishment and modification poli-
cies place special burdens on these low-income child support obligors.
The first impact of the new policies is the pressure placed on putative
unmarried fathers to voluntarily acknowledge or consent to paternity
orders. As discussed earlier, a cornerstone of the federal effort to re-
duce welfare costs has been to increase paternity establishment.
147
On its face, this aspect of "welfare reform" has been a success with the
number of paternity establishments increasing dramatically over the
last decade. 148 Strengthening the bond between children of unmar-
ried parents and their fathers can certainly yield important social 149
and economic1 5 0 benefits. While the legal establishment of paternity
may have some connection to these social and economic benefits,
such benefits do not automatically follow from a paternity order.'
5 1
146 See, e.g., Mark Greenberg & Hedieh Rahmanou, Looking to the Future: Commen-
tary 1, THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Summer 2004, at 139, 139 (noting that "one-quarter of
the nation's low-income children . . .are now immigrants or the children of immi-
grants" and that "[a ny national strategy for reducing child poverty, promoting child
well-being and helping low-wage workers advance must address the needs and circum-
stances of immigrants and their children").
147 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
148 Between 1992 and 2000, paternity establishment increased from 500,000 to 1.5
million. CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 6; see also Virginia Ellis, Fathers'Legal Ties that
Bind, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at Al (highlighting the increase in paternity filings
since the January, 1997 enactment of PRWORA and finding there was a 600% in-
crease in the number of fathers signing paternity declarations in 1997).
149 See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995) (summarizing research demonstrating the impor-
tance of the involvement of fathers in children's emotional development, success in
school, and adult relationships);JAMES A. LEVINE WITH EDWARD W. PITT, NEW EXPECTA-
TIONS: COMMUNITY STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 26-27 (1995) (explain-
ing that nurturing father involvement during infancy dramatically improves a child's
cognitive, intellectual, and social development throughout childhood).
150 Judith Seizer, Child Support and Child Access: Experiences of Divorced and
Nonmarital Families, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 128, at 69,
73-74.
151 Because of other differences between fathers who establish paternity and those
that do not, "[r]esearch cannot yet answer the question of how the legal establish-
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the efforts to encourage early and easy paternity establish-
ment may cause more harm than good for fathers and children. The
child support enforcement bureaucracy can destabilize relationships
between parents, and easy paternity establishment has led to in-
creased efforts to disestablish paternity several years later.
The demographic profile of many of the fathers who fall behind
in child support discussed earlier-young, poor, uneducated 152 -
make them particularly vulnerable in the paternity establishment pro-
cess. What was once a full quasi-criminal adversarial process often in-
cluding ajury trial,153 has become, more often than not, a nonjudicial
process that involves little more than signing a piece of paper.1 54
While federal law requires oral and written disclosure of information
about the legal consequernces of paternity establishment before volun-
tary acknowledgment, 155 the disclosures are not an effective substitute
for legal counsel, or even the advice of an informed layperson. The
concerns of advocates for low-income parents make clear the limita-
tions of written disclosures in meaningfully informing putative fathers
of the legal consequences of acknowledging paternity. 156 In addition,
many acknowledgments occur in a hospital setting shortly after the
child's birth. This heightens the emotional pressures that tend to re-
sult in acknowledgments by nonbiological fathers. 157
ment of paternity-by itself, after other differences between parents who do and do
not establish paternity are taken into account-affects the emotional and financial
support available to children of unmarried parents." NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. &
CTR. ON FATHERS, FAMILIES, & PUB. POLICY, FAMILY TIES: IMPROVING PATERNITY ESTAB-
LISHMENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHIL-
DREN 7 (2000) [hereinafter FAMILY TIES]; see also infra note 216 (showing that the legal
establishment of paternity does not always lead to establishment of child support
order).
152 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
153 KRAUSE, supra note 30, at 109-11.
154 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
155 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (C) (i) (2000).
156 FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 17-18. These observations confirm the author's
experience in interviewing pro se litigants in paternity and child support proceedings
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. See Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice:
Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should
Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1903-04 (1999) (describ-
ing the Baltimore City Circuit Pro Se Divorce Project, which was developed by the
University of Baltimore and the University of Maryland Law School clinics).
157 Participants in the Common Ground Project, which brought together advo-
cates and representatives of low-income mothers and fathers to discuss paternity es-
tablishment practices and procedures, described the hospital locale as "problematic"
and "expressed concerns about the hospital setting because current hospital mater-
nity stays are brief and the period surrounding childbirth is emotionally stressful.
Thus, parents are often not emotionally or mentally equipped to digest the paternity
[VOL. 8 1: 1
LEGAL IMAGES OF FATHERHOOD
The judicial process for establishment of paternity orders offers
more procedural safeguards than the voluntary acknowledgment pro-
cess, but there are still substantial risks in the judicial context that
men will become legal fathers with little understanding of the legal
consequences. In the case of judgments entered by default, putative
fathers often do not get actual notice of the proceedings and the judg-
ment is entered without their knowledge or participation. 158 Even if
they are present in court, putative fathers are rarely represented by
counsel, 159 and both the volume of cases and the routine treatment of
cases by the child support agency or its counsel leave many fathers
misinformed about the significance of the proceedings. 160 As a result
of all these circumstances, many men acknowledged or consented to
paternity with very little understanding of the legal ramifications of
their actions.
Another factor leading to the ultimate push to disestablish pater-
nity is the potentially unfair child support orders established for low-
income fathers following the establishment of paternity. As noted,
since the late 1980s, states have made initial awards of support based
on a variety of fixed formulas. The most common approach to estab-
lishing an initial award of child support is the Income Shares
acknowledgment form and/or make a decision during the hospital maternity stay."
FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 17. The pressure to acknowledge paternity in this
setting is increased by the statutory requirement that a nonmarital father's name can-
not appear on a child's birth certificate unless he has signed an acknowledgment of
paternity or has been adjudicated to be the father by a court or administrative tribu-
nal. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (D) (i) (I)-(II).
158 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 18-22; see also Susan McRae, Rare Ruling
Reverses Default Paternity Judgment, L.A. DAILY J., July 2, 2004, at I (describing case in
which court reversed defaultjudgment of paternity after six-month limitation to chal-
lenge the order where putative father testified that he had never received a summons
and complaint or notice of the default judgment).
159 Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Re-
sponse to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J.
105, 110 (2001) (describing a 1991-1992 study of sixteen large urban areas nation-
wide finding that seventy-two percent of all domestic relations cases involved at least
one unrepresented party); see also DEP'T OF FAMILY ADMIN., MD. JUDICIARY, 2003 AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY DIVISIONS & FAMILY SERVICES
PROGRAMS 29-30 (2003) (stating that sixty-four percent of litigants in family disputes
in Maryland were self-represented).
160 Stacy L. Brustin, The Intersection Between Welfare Reform and Child Support Enforce-
ment: D.C. 's Weak Link, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 621, 642-43 (2003); see also Transcript of
Record at 28-32, Gantt v. Sanchez, No. PD 60-104431 (Md. Cir. Ct. Bait. City Nov. 8,
1999) (providing one father's testimony describing his confusion about the legal
ramifications of signing a paternity acknowledgement and lack of explanation about
the process) (on file with author).
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Model.1 61 These formulae base child support obligations on the mar-
ginal costs of raising children in a two-parent family.1 62 This "one size
fits all" approach to child support can result in unreasonably high
awards for low-income obligors. The income shares formulae take a
larger percentage of income from low-income obligors because low-
income families have to spend a greater percentage of their income
on their children. 163 In addition, as one scholar observed, for most
nonmarital families where children have never lived in an intact
household, the Income Shares Model's "replication of past expendi-
tures is pure fiction."'1 64
In addition to formulae skewed against low-income obligors, sev-
eral other policies and circumstances at the establishment stage con-
tribute to punitive awards for low-income fathers. The definition of
income embodied in statutes and case law permit courts or agencies
to impute income to obligors if, under varying criteria, the court be-
lieves the obligor is earning less than he should be. 165 The theory
behind such imputation of income statutes is that they can be used to
both discourage obligors from underreporting income and encourage
full employment. 166 However, when such policies are applied to obli-
gors who are chronically unemployed or in seasonal or other part
time employment, they result in unpayable support and ever increas-
ing arrearages. 167 Even where legitimate defenses to imputation of
income exist, without legal counsel these obligors often are unable to
present them.168 Moreover, given the high rate of default judgments
161 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 84, at 735.
162 ESPENSHADE, supra note 89.
163 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 11 (finding that both the Income Shares
Model and other provisions of state guidelines such as the child care and medical
expenses provision and adjustments when fathers have multiple families contribute to
"regressive" guidelines "requiring low-income custodial parents to pay a larger share
of their income toward child support than higher-income non-custodial parents"); see
also Vicki Lynn Bell, Alimony and Child Support Generally: Amend Child Support Calcula-
tions, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 169, 176 (1995) (finding that many Income Shares guide-
line models for child support take a higher percentage of income from low-income
obligors than is taken from high income obligors).
164 Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157,
168 (1999).
165 LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLIcA-
TION § 2.04[a], [c] (Supp. 2004).
166 Id.
167 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 116, at tbl.11, available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/reports/preliminary-data/table
11 .html.
168 See supra note 159.
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for child support orders, 169 many obligors are not even present to pro-
vide testimony about their income and ability to pay.
The problems associated with excessive initial awards are often
compounded by child support modification policies. First, state laws
on when modification is justified vary considerably.170 Some states do
not permit downward modification in situations in which an obligor is
clearly unable to maintain the income earned or imputed at the point
of the initial award. For example, in some states, incarceration is not
a sufficient basis for a downward modification. 171 Even in those situa-
169 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 18-22; NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & CTR. ON
FATHERS, FAMILIES & PUB. POLICY, DOLLARS AND SENSE: IMPROVING THE DETERMINATION
OF CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHILDREN
14, 29 (2002) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND SENSE]; McRae, supra note 158, at 1 (report-
ing that default judgments are entered in forty-seven percent of California's paternity
judgments).
170 See MORGAN, supra note 165, § 5.01 (discussing the common law standard for
modification: substantial and continuing change in circumstances which generally re-
quires proof of a change that is material, substantial, and permanent).
171 See, e.g., Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling
that father's reduction in income due to his incarceration was insufficient to relieve
him of his child support obligation because the reduction was caused by his voluntary
acts); Staffon v. Staffon, 587 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 2003) (ruling that where the natural and
foreseeable consequences of father's voluntary conduct resulted in his imprisonment,
placing him in a position where he was unable to earn income, a downward modifica-
tion of child support was not warranted); In re Marriage of Thurmond, 962 P.2d 1064
(Kan. 1998) (refusing to reduce or suspend support obligation where parent's incar-
ceration was the only change of circumstances); Mooney v. Brennan, 848 P.2d 1020
(Mont. 1993) (holding it was not unconscionable to refuse a downward modification
of father's child support obligation when the changed circumstances were due to his
incarceration for the commission of a crime); Knights v. Knights, 522 N.E.2d 1045
(N.Y. 1988) (denying ex-husband's application for modification of child support be-
cause his financial hardship was a result of wrongful conduct resulting in his incarcer-
ation); Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299 (N.D. 1990) (holding that former husband's
incarceration for incest was voluntary and self-induced, failing to constitute a material
change in circumstances warranting a modification of child support); Yerkes v.
Yerkes, 824 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 2003) (adopting the "no justification" approach, holding
that criminal incarceration was not sufficient to justify a reduction in child support
based on the best interests of the child and principles of fairness in not allowing
obligor to benefit from his criminal acts); Carlsen v. Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs., 722
P.2d 775 (Utah 1986) (holding that ex-husband must reimburse state for public sup-
port given his child while he was incarcerated and unable to make child support pay-
ments). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 660(f) (2002) (allowing the court discretion
to modify an order as to past support installments accruing after noncustodial par-
ent's incarceration); Bendixen v. Bendixen, 962 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1998) (holding that
a father's incarceration was not equivalent to voluntary unemployment and requiring
him to establish a substantial reduction in income to secure a reduction in child sup-
port payments); Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1993) (finding that the district
court did not err in reducing father's child support obligation due to his sentence of
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tions where the law supports a reduction of child support, lack of legal
representation often prevents timely application for modification. 172
Since 1986, federal law has prohibited retroactive modification of ar-
rearages. 173 This is sound policy when applied as a check against judi-
cial discretion that was often exercised to forgive arrearages for
middle- or high-income obligors who repeatedly evaded their support
obligation. When rigidly applied to low-income obligors, however,
this policy becomes another example of the unintended conse-
quences of the welfare policy.174 For example, a father may become
disabled or become custodian of the children. Unless he initiates a
court action promptly, he will continue to owe child support and ar-
rearages will accumulate indefinitely to a point where payment is no
longer possible. 175
Whether through inappropriate guidelines, imputation of in-
come, or modification policies, unrealistically high awards lead to
high arrearages. 176 Low-income obligors are then subject to child sup-
port enforcement sanctions. As noted, these sanctions include in-
come attachment, motor vehicle and professional license suspension,
credit reporting, and incarceration. 77 While enforcement actions
were once judicial proceedings, most, except incarceration, are now
life imprisonment). See generally SusAN C. ANTOS, GREATER UPSTATE LAW PROJECT,
INC., CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS (2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
partnersinjustice/child-support.pdf (criticizing New York's rule prohibiting modifica-
tion and recommending that more equitable policies be crafted); Prisons Offer No Es-
cape from Paying Child Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, § 1, at 35 (describing
disparity in policies regarding the collection of child support from prisoners and not-
ing some "unforgiving policies that may whisk a man back to prison because he could
not pay debts that built up while he was behind bars").
172 See supra note 159; see also Wheeler v. State, 864 A.2d 210, 217-18 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2004) (denying a pro se incarcerated father's motion to terminate child
support during his prison term and, instead, suspending the obligation and ordering
that it be automatically reinstated within three days of his release).
173 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(c) (2000). Child support obligations are also not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005).
174 Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for "Dead-
broke" Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support Issues, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 5, 9 (2003).
175 Id.
176 The Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement reported that there were 90
billion dollars worth of accumulated child support arrearages in fiscal year 2002. OF-
FICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (CSE) FY 2002 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/prelim-datareport/.
About half the debt is owed to the state for welfare reimbursement and about two-
thirds of the people who owe the debt earned less than $10,000 per year. Id.
177 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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done administratively without an opportunity for a hearing before im-
position of the sanction. 17 The impact of these sanctions is further
strengthened by a system of tracking and collecting information on
fathers who owe child support1 79 that "creates a detailed profile of
who you are, what you do and what you are likely to do."1 1 Under
"the most onerous form of debt collection practiced in the United
States,"18' jobs, credit history, and housing are lost, and economically
fragile circumstances become desperate.
In the past, these sanctions often led to legal fathers going "be-
low-ground. '18 2 In recent years, many fathers have discovered a new
way to defend these child support actions by challenging the underly-
ing order of paternity.18 3 Courts have responded to these paternity
178 Most enforcement actions are triggered by a missed child support payment
tracked by the computer for the agency. Those that the agency can take without
seeking a court or administrative order include income withholding, securing assets
(including bank accounts, workers' compensation payments, employment compensa-
tion payments, retirement and pension funds), imposing liens, voiding fraudulent
property transfers, suspending professional and recreational licenses, and revoking
passports. PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 362, 364, 368-370, 110 Stat. 2105,
2242-47, 2249-52 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, and 42
U.S.C.).
179 42 U.S.C. §666(a)(5)(C) (2000). See generally Robert Pear, Vast Worker
Database To Track Deadbeat Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A] (describing the
national directory of new hires).
180 Samuel V. Schoonmaker, IV, Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in
the "Welfare Reform Act, " 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 1, 51 (1997). There is
some recognition in the statute that the massive information sharing contemplated
under the statute may violate the privacy of obligors. 42 U.S.C. § 654(26) (requiring
that safeguards established to ensure access to confidential information is limited to
authorized persons). But commentators point out that these provisions are rendered
"practically meaningless by other provisions in the law that permit broad information
sharing." Brito, supra note 23, at 263.
181 Ronald K Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes Upon
Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 239 (1999).
182 Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 174, at 5.
183 Under traditional state law, final civil judgments can only be reopened in cases
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648 A.2d
439 (Md. 1994). State law varies on what constitutes mistake, fraud, or duress but
many states now permit reopening based on an exception to this final judgment rule
or based on the father's assertion that he was "defrauded" about the biological link
with his child. Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the Paternity
of Non-Marital Children 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 82-85 (2003). While many of these disestab-
lishment actions are triggered by onerous child support burdens, they are facilitated
by changes in the DNA testing technology making such testing more accessible. Until
a few years ago, paternity testing was invasive, required the participation of both par-
ents and the child and cost from $700 to $1,000. Recent advances allow DNA testing
through a simple cheek swab, no longer require the participation of the mother, and
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challenges in a variety of ways. While no coherent patterns have
emerged, 18 4 not surprisingly, children of married parents are gener-
ally more protected than children of unmarried parents. Courts hear-
ing competing claims for fatherhood of children of married parents
or requests to disestablish paternity by married fathers often preserve
the relationship between the child and the married father where the
husband is the psychological rather than the biological father.185 In a
can cost as little as $200 when done through a private rather than court-ordered lab
testing. AJanuary 15, 2005 web search revealed over fifty sites that mentioned pater-
nity testing kits. Dozens of these sites advertised home testing kits free or at low cost.
See, e.g., Gene Tree DNA Testing Center, Free DNA Paternity Test Collection Kit,
http://www.genetree.com/product/free-kit.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (offering
to ship free kits and requiring payment to send the samples back for testing); Pro-
phase Genetics, Paternity Testing Services, http://www.prophase-genetics.com (last
visited Sept. 3, 2005) (offering kits and results for $165).
184 For a thorough analysis of paternity disestablishment statutes and case law, see
Roberts, supra note 183; Memorandum from Paula Roberts, Ctr. for Law & Social
Policy, to Interested People (June 17, 2004), available at http://clasp.org/publica-
tions/Paternity-Update2.pdf.
185 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pedregon, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Ct. App. 2003)
(ruling that where the husband held out a nonbiological child as his own, he estab-
lished the paternal relationship and was required to pay child support); Rodney F. v.
Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that an alleged biological
father could not bring a paternity action due to the presumption of paternity of mari-
tal father); Leger v. Leger, 829 So. 2d 1101 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that wife had
no legal authority to rebut presumption of husband's paternity when the child was
born during the marriage or within 300 days after the divorce); Evans v. Wilson, 856
A.2d 679 (Md. 2004) (denying unmarried paramour's attempt to establish paternity
in light of mother's husband's status as legal father); McHone v. Sosnowski, 609
N.W.2d 844 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that alleged biological father could not
bring claim unless there was a prior determination that child was not the product of
the marriage); Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d 350 (N.H. 1975) (denying husband's motion
for blood tests where parents were married and father acknowledged children for
fifteen years); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (rejecting DNA evidence
excluding husband as father of parties' youngest child based on marital presumption
and best interest of child born to married parents); John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d
1380 (Pa. 1990) (holding that marital presumption can be overcome only by proving
non-access or impotency); Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(holding that presumption of paternity was not overcome by DNA test eliminating
husband as biological father); Culhane v. Michels, 615 N.W.2d 580, 589-90 (S.D.
2000) (denying genetic testing where father challenged paternity of marital children
whom he had acknowledged as his own for eighteen years); In re T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d
481, 487 (Tex. App. 2001) (refusing to admit DNA evidence excluding husband as
biological father where parents were married and father had acknowledged child as
his own for fourteen years); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910-11 (Vt. 1998) (deny-
ing husband's motion for paternity testing, citing the marital presumption of pater-
nity and the superior interests of the state, the family, and the child in "maintaining
the continuity, financial support, and psychological security of an established parent-
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few states, paternity disestablishment requests have been denied for
both children of married and unmarried parents under statutes of
limitations or on estoppel grounds that cut off a man's right to chal-
lenge paternity after a period of time.'8 6 But in a growing number of
child relationship"); Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 86 (W. Va. 2002) (rul-
ing that nonbiological father's acknowledgement of marital child as his own for six
years during marriage and four years after divorce precluded him from terminating
or modifying child support). But see K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1996) (holding
that Indiana law permits a man who claims to be the biological father of a child born
during the marriage of the child's mother and another man to file a paternity action
while that marriage remains intact); Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that marital father had a right to visitation or custody, despite DNA
proving he was not the biological father, because of the existing parent-child bond);
Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001) (granting DNA testing to a man who
asserted that he had an affair with a married woman who had a child); Poskarbiewicz
v. Poskarbiewicz, 787 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that, although the
child and the mother's husband were not blood-related, severing the parent-child
relationship between child and mother's husband would not be in the best interest of
the child); Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. 1997) (admitting DNA evidence
that proved the husband was not the biological father of the child produced during
marriage because the parents were no longer married at the time of action and there-
fore there was no institution of marriage to protect).
186 See, e.g., People ex rel. J A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo. 2002) (stating that
judgments may only be reopened within a "reasonable time"); D.F. v. Dep't of Reve-
nue ex rel. L.F., 823 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2002) (denying motion to reopen paternity judg-
ment filed after one year); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d 1204
(Ill. 2004) (denying the motion of a man to disestablish paternity because he origi-
nally voluntarily acknowledged paternity but then delayed bringing the motion for
more than sixty days); In re Marriage of Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153 (II. 2001) (noting that
under the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4) (West 2000), a
paternity action cannot be brought more than two years after adjudicated father ob-
tains "actual knowledge of relevant facts"); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488
(Mass. 2001) (denying a motion to disestablish under the rule that judgment may
only be reopened within a "reasonable time"); DeGrande v. Demby, 529 N.W.2d 340
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (applying the three-year statute of limitations in the Minnesota
Parentage Act, MINN. STAT. § 257.57 (Supp. 1993), to the reopening of paternity judg-
ments); F.B. v. A.L.G., 821 A.2d 1157 (N.J. 2003) (denying motion of putative father
to vacate paternity judgment several years after he waived right to genetic tests and
acknowledged paternity because he did not prove fraud and he had acted as the fa-
ther for eight years); Romine v. Trip, No. OOCA12, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4602 (Ct.
App. Sept. 29, 2000) (applying the one-year statute of limitations for the reopening of
paternity judgments pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 5101.314 (repealed 2001)). But
see Ex parteJ.Z., 668 So. 2d 566 (Ala. 1995) (ruling that incarceration at the time a
defaultjudgment of paternity was entered against nonbiological legal father does not
constitute a truly compelling circumstance to overcome the policy in favor of finality
or the "reasonable time" requirement of Rule 60(b) when paternity judgment had
been established for twelve years); Dixon v. Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1999) (stat-
ing that a man's motion to set aside a divorce decree establishing paternity was not
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jurisdictions-even where disestablishment will leave a child father-
less-courts187 and legislatures' 88 have opted for a rule based on biol-
ogy. Under various articulations of this rule, if a man, who has been
made within an unreasonable time when it was brought two and one-half years after
the divorce).
187 State ex rel. A.T., 695 So. 2d 624 (Ala. 1997) (admitting DNA evidence based
on ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 (1975), which permits reopening of paternity cases based on
DNA evidence); Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Button, 7 P.3d
74 (Alaska 2000) (allowing DNA evidence to be admitted nine years after paternity
acknowledgement by nonbiological father); In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (permitting disestablishment of paternity despite ten-year rela-
tionship with child, finding best interests of the child not relevant to decision); Walter
v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002) (holding that DNA evidence was admissible in
challenging paternity, and once it was established the unmarried man was not biologi-
cal father, he could not be held liable for arrearages in child support); Langston v.
Rifle, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000) (holding that DNA testing is available to any putative
father who seeks to challenge a paternity declaration entered against him); K.B. v.
D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (ruling that husband need not pay
child support seven years after the child's birth when DNA proved the child was not
his because it is the duty of the "natural parents" to support the child); State ex rel.
Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. Hill, 53 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (per-
mitting unmarried man to admit DNA evidence to challenge paternity); Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Chisum, 85 P.3d 860 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (granting motion to
disestablish paternity finding that genetic testing excluding father created "material
mistake of fact" and that neither equity nor the best interests of the child applied in
paternity cases where genetic testing excluded the movant); Brinkley v. King, 701
A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997) (vacating the superior court's order denying mother's motion for
blood tests where presumption of paternity did not apply). But see In re Bethards, 526
N.W.2d 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (terminating child support obligations based largely
on blood tests disestablishing paternity, stating it would be wrong of the court to en-
dorse and continue the fraud on the child who believes his mother's ex-husband is his
biological father); Smith v.Jones, 566 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (admitting DNA
evidence presented by biological father but finding that the child may have two "fa-
thers," i.e. "dual paternity"); Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003) (hold-
ing that it would be unjust to require divorced husband to support a child when DNA
tests prove he is not the father); M.A.S. v. Miss. Dep't of Human Servs., 842 So. 2d 527
(Miss. 2003) (allowing DNA evidence to be admitted nine years after paternity ac-
knowledgement by minor nonbiological father because it would be "profoundly un-
just" to require him to continue to make payments); Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279
(Pa. 2003) (disestablishing paternity despite the parent-child relationship because the
father would not have held the child out as his own had he known he was not the
biological father as determined by DNA testing).
188 ALA. CODE § 26-17-12 (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.27.166 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2002 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1) (b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2004); 750 ILL.
COMp. STAT. ANN. 45/7(b-5) (West 1999); IowA CODE ANN. § 600B.41 (West 2001);
MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-1029 (LexisNexis 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(b)
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(3) (b) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3119.961-.967 (LexisNexis 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (2004).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
LEGAL IMAGES OF FATHERHOOD
the legal father by conduct or by a paternity judgment or acknowl-
edgement, has suspicions about his biological connection to the child,
he is entitled to have DNA testing on demand. 8 9 If tests exclude him
as the biological father, he is no longer a father under the law and has
no legal, social, or other obligations to his child.
A rule based on biology alone has potentially devastating effects
in any family. But its effects on low-income families are particularly
harmful. It completes a cycle in which the punitive aspects of welfare
reform-first aimed at the mother, and then the father-may
culminate in leaving children fatherless. Taking a closer look at one
state's experience with the new fatherhood rules illustrates the con-
nections between welfare reform, paternity disestablishment, and
harm to children left fatherless.
C. Case Study: Maryland
Maryland is one of several states that has opted to define fathers
by biology in response to legal fathers of nonmarital children who
defend against child support enforcement actions by seeking paternity
disestablishment. The leading Maryland case, Langston v. Riffe, 911 in-
volved three consolidated cases that arose in response to child support
proceedings involving men who had voluntarily acknowledged pater-
nity of their nonmarital children. 191 The state's highest court held
that pursuant to 1995 amendments to the state's paternity statute, 192
the fathers were allowed to set aside the paternity judgments when
genetic tests excluded them as biological fathers. The court further
noted that the best interests of the child standard is not relevant when
considering requests for DNA testing or requests to set aside judg-
ments after DNA testing excludes the legal father as the biological
father. 193 The court also held that, although the decision would leave
189 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1029, as interpreted by Langston v. Rifle,
754 A.2d 389, 389 (Md. 2000).
190 754 A.2d 389.
191 Id. at 390-92.
192 A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside "if a blood or genetic
test done in accordance with § 5-1029 [blood or genetic tests] of this subtitle estab-
lishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order." MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a) (2) (i) (2).
193 As stated by the court in Langston:
Simply stated, the fact of who the father of a child is cannot be changed
by what might be in the best interests of the child .... [T]he "best interests"
standard is only to be considered by the trial court in matters corollary to the
paternity declaration, such as custody, visitation, "giving bond," or "any
other matter that is related to the general welfare and best interests of the
child."
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the children involved fatherless because the biological fathers would
likely never be found, these considerations should not "diminish the
immediate substantive effect of setting aside an established paternity
declaration.' '1 94
In 2002 Maryland's highest court revisited the issue of paternity
disestablishment and child support in Walter v. Gunter.195 Again, the
context was a legal father's attempt to set aside a paternity judgment
as a defense to a child support arrearage case. In 1993, Nicholas Wal-
ter voluntarily consented to a paternity judgment for a child born to
his girlfriend, Michele Gunter. Walter was then ordered to pay child
support and throughout the next several years numerous proceedings
were instituted against Walter to enforce the support obligation. In
2000, he filed a petition to modify support as well as a motion for
genetic testing. The testing excluded Walter as the biological father
and the trial court followed its earlier decision in Langston and termi-
nated his future support obligations.196 A separate hearing was held
to determine Walter's liability for his child support arrearages and
whether he was entitled to recover support payments that he had al-
ready paid to Gunter.' 97 Based on the well established statutory prohi-
bition against retroactive modification of child support,198 the trial
court denied his request for release from the arrearage obligation and
recoupment of payments.
Walter appealed the judgment holding him liable for arrearages
and the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court and found that Walter was not responsible for payment of the
arrearages. 99 The court found that although the record showed that
754 A.2d at 399-400, 405.
194 Id. at 426.
195 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002).
196 Id. at 611.
197 Id.
198 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The federal prohibition on retroac-
tive modification is codified in MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 5-1038 (LexisNexis
2004).
199 The Maryland court did not require the mother to reimburse the legal father
for child support. Walter, 788 A.2d at 613. Some states have allowed tort actions to
proceed against mothers to recover child support in a related context. G.A.W. v.
D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding tort claim of ex-husband
against mother to recover child support was not barred by resjudicata, collateral es-
toppel, or public policy considerations where he discovered he was not the biological
father during dissolution of marriage); Haller v. Haller, 839 A.2d 18 (N.H. 2003)
(dismissing tort action against the state, but suggesting in dicta that plaintiff might be
able to sue mother or biological father); Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998)
(permitting claims of ex-husband who discovered he was not the biological father of a
child for whom he had paid support for ten years); see also Andrew S. Epstein, The
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Walter had questions about his paternity for some time before the
action, the genetic test "extinguished" Walter's parenthood. As a re-
sult, the child support order, including arrearages in excess of $11,000
was vacated. 21°0 The court relied on the state's history of placing child
support "'squarely upon the shoulders of the natural [biological] par-
ents'" 20 as well as principles of natural law.20 2 In so holding the court
clearly equated fatherhood with biology:
Without question, the biological and legal status of "parenthood" in
Walter's situation is now extinct; the genetic test extinguishes the
prior, and the vacatur of the paternity declaration extinguishes the
latter. In the absence of "parenthood" status, the duty that is nor-
mally cast upon parents, e.g. the duty of child support, can no
longer exist.
2 0 3
Maryland's "biology rule" in Langston and Walter exemplifies an
approach to defining fatherhood that does not serve the interests of
families, particularly low-income fathers or children. A brief look at
one of the author's clinical program's typical cases demonstrates the
link between child support policies, the "biology rule" and the
breakup of fragile families.
The clinic's child client, Maria M., was fourteen years old when
the court appointed the clinic to represent her in an action by her
father to vacate his paternity judgment.20 4 Until Maria was about four
years old, she lived with her mother. Her mother's boyfriend, James,
Parent Trap: Should a Man Be Allowed To Recoup Child Support Payments if He Discovers He
Is Not the Biological Father of the Child?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 655, 665 (2004) (addressing
fundamental fairness analyses regarding child paternity cases when a man has been
scientifically eliminated as the father). In addition, at least one state statute autho-
rizes repayment of child support after disestablishment when such support has been
paid to the state. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-171(b) (West 2004) (providing that if
a court reopens a paternity case in which the person adjudicated to be the father of a
child is not the father of the child, and the person has paid child support to the state
(as opposed to the mother), the Department of Social Services will refund the money
paid to the state). But see Bouchard v. Frost, 840 A.2d 109 (Me. 2004) (dismissing tort
action to recover money paid for child support to mother or state).
200 788 A.2d at 609.
201 Id. at 615 (quoting Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 548 (Md. 1986)).
202 "The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a
principle of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by
their own proper act, in bringing them into the world." Id. (quoting Brown v. Brown,
412 A.2d 396, 402 (Md. 1980)).
203 Id.
204 Gantt v. Sanchez, No. PD 60-104431 (Md. Cir. Ct. Bait. City Nov. 8, 1999) (on
file with author). Although the use of first names for clients is not customary in the
author's clinical program, first names have been used for easy identification and to
protect the parties' identities.
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had assumed the role of Maria's father. He lived with her and her
mother at various times during these four years but did not provide
regular financial support. When the mother applied for public bene-
fits, she identifiedJames as Maria's father. He consented to paternity
without genetic testing.
James and Maria's mother grew apart, the mother became drug
addicted, and Maria went to live with her grandmother when she was
four years old. Ten years later, James sought to reopen the paternity
judgment after his truck driver's license was revoked and he was sub-
jected to criminal prosecution for nonsupport. Since he never had a
genetic test prior to signing the paternity decree, he was able to chal-
lenge his paternity under the Maryland statute by requesting a blood
test. At the hearing on his motion for blood test, a child development
expert testified that, given Maria's circumstances, even the act of re-
quiring her to go through a blood test and thereby learn of her fa-
ther's effort to "disown" her would cause her substantial harm.20 5
James testified that he, too, had some emotional attachment to the
child.20 6 Under existing law, however, James had to make a choice
between risking harm to her or facing financial ruin for himself and
his biological children.
Given the Langston biology rule, Maryland courts and those in
other states following this approach must permit genetic testing when
requested and vacate paternity orders in all cases where there is no
biological connection between child and father, regardless of the fam-
ily's circumstances. Moreover, given the inflexibility of the current
child support policies, courts have little or no discretion to reduce
arrearages, suspend child support obligations, or provide fathers like
James with some equitable remedies that will permit them to maintain
their legal status as father. Instead, children like Maria are left father-
less for life.207
The threat of DNA testing on demand destabilizes the relation-
ships between parents as well as those between father and child and
205 Transcript of Record at 7-8, Gantt, No. PD 60-104431 (testimony of Dr. Leon
Rosenberg) (on file with author).
206 Id. at 37-40 (testimony of Desmond Sanchez).
207 In Maria's case, the parties ultimately reached a settlement in which the father
agreed to maintain his status as legal father as long as the local State's Attorney's
Office (the office charged with child support enforcement in the jurisdiction) re-
frained from enforcing his past, present, or future child support obligations. All par-
ties believed such a settlement was the best option for the child in this case given
existing Maryland law. It was not ideal, however, given that the threat of disestablish-
ment was still present in the event personnel changes in the child support enforce-
ment agency or other circumstances led to renewed efforts to collect child support
from James.
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undermines all existing policies favoring fathers' continued involve-
ment in children's lives. In many cases, particularly those involving
older children, there is no one "waiting in the wings" to be the child's
father. Vacating the paternity judgment or acknowledgment leaves
the child fatherless for life, with the attendant loss of emotional sup-
port, companionship, child support, inheritance rights, and other
benefits. Even where the child has already lost contact with the legal
father, the child's loss is further exacerbated by finding out that the
only father she has ever known does not want to be her father any-
more.208 Many fathers who would be willing and might prefer to stay
in a child's life are forced to seek disestablishment of paternity or face
loss of employment, credit standing, jail, or permanent poverty. 2°0-9
III. PROPOSALS FOR RLFORM
To develop meaningful reform, policymakers must reconceive
child support as primarily an issue of family law rather than welfare
law. As such, protection of children replaces state and federal fiscal
concerns as the goal that drives child support law and policy. 2 10 Once
that goal is clear, the foundation will be laid for a number of reforms.
These include: (1) refining paternity establishment policies to reduce
the number of fathers who assume the role of fatherhood mistakenly
or with little thought about the consequences; 211 (2) refining child
support establishment and modification policies to treat low-income
fathers more fairly so that they are not pushed into paternity disestab-
lishment as the only alternative to financial ruin; and (3) creating pa-
ternity disestablishment policies that place the best interests of the
child above the interests of the adults and recognize multiple bases
for legal fatherhood.
208 Transcript of Record at 7-8, Gantt, No. PD 60-104431 (testimony of Dr. Leon
Rosenberg); see also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP 219 (1980) (noting that children choose to maintain established parent-
child relationships even where the relationship is poor or has deteriorated).
209 See, e.g., All Things Considered: DNA and Family Law (NPR radio broadcast Apr.
9, 2001) (reporting about father seeking to disestablish paternity to stop child support
obligation who expressed continuing affection and concern for child at issue).
210 There is broad consensus that, among the traditional goals of family, protec-
tion of children is the primary goal. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and
Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Prr-r. L. REv.
1111, 1183 (1999).
211 The goal of these efforts should not be to prevent all nonbiological fathers
from gaining the status of legal fatherhood. Instead, the goal is to have men consent
to paternity only when they have made a meaningful decision to be fathers. In many
cases, it will be the biological fathers who make this decision. In some cases, men who
have no genetic connection may also make a decision to become legal fathers.
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A. Rethinking the Link Between Welfare and Child Support
As scholars and policymakers begin to evaluate the impact of the
last three decades of federal legislation, many are beginning to ques-
tion the link that body of legislation established between welfare and
child support.212 While a careful evaluation of this link is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief assessment of the impact of linking child
support with welfare law reveals both its policy limitations and its neg-
ative impact on low-income families.
As discussed earlier, aggressive child support enforcement has
done little to reduce child poverty.21 3 The linking of child support
collection with welfare eligibility has also largely failed in meeting its
other goal: to increase revenues for the state. 214 Although the initial
data was promising, 215 the policy's success in reimbursing the state for
its welfare costs is decidedly mixed. Increasing the number of pater-
nity establishments may end up having some noneconomic benefits
for children but it has done little to increase the number of support
orders for children on welfare.216 Even if more orders were obtained
and more support was collected from noncustodial fathers, one widely
cited study predicted that, given the poverty of this population of obli-
gor fathers, even full payment of child support would only reduce
combined spending for cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid by
eight percent.2 17 Moreover, there is substantial evidence that adminis-
trative costs of collecting child support may exceed the dollars col-
lected to offset welfare costs.2 18
212 Brito, supra note 23; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Child Support Is Not the
Answer: The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare Reform (claiming that child support is not
the best solution and discussing the need to extend responsibility outside the realm of
the private family), in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 128, at 209,
209.
213 See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
215 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 4-10 (noting initial data showing overall in-
crease in child support collection post-1996).
216 Garrison, supra note 134, at 17 and sources cited therein; see a/soJEssICA PEAR-
SON & NANCY THOENNES, CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE CHILD SUPPORT IMPROVE-
MENT PROJECT: PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT 50 (1995) (finding that fifteen months
following birth, only twenty-six percent of parents who voluntarily acknowledged pa-
ternity and were in the child support system had a child support order); Brustin, supra
note 160, at 625 (noting that in the District of Columbia in 2000 less that twenty
percent of TANF (welfare) recipients had a child support order).
217 Laura Wheaton & Elaine Sorensen, Reducing Welfare Costs and Dependency: How
Much Bang for the Child Support Buck?, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'v REv. 23, 30, 34 (1998).
218 Office of Child Support Enforcement data for fiscal year 1999 collections in
the welfare caseload totaled only $0.62 for every dollar in enforcement costs. OFFICE
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In addition to its ineffectiveness in reducing welfare costs, the
linking of child support to welfare benefits harms low-income families
in a variety of ways. The principle provision of the legislation that
creates this link is the requirement that, as a condition of receiving
full public benefits, recipients assign their rights to child support to
the state. 219 Welfare recipients must also fulfill a "cooperation re-
quirement" by identifying the fathers of their children so the state can
pursue those men for child support.220 Federal law had long required
assignment of support and cooperation but the PRWORA eliminated
any "pass through"-a portion of child support paid by fathers goes to
families instead of the state. 221 The 1996 statute also gave states broad
discretion in determining what constitutes "cooperation" and whether
"good cause" exists for non-cooperation. 222
Both the assignment and cooperation requirements create a
number of problems for low-income families. An assignment require-
ment that prevents children from benefiting from support paid by
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1999 AND 2000 tbl.1 (2001), available at http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2002/reports/datareport/table-1.html. Even
this figure may overstate the cost-effectiveness of child support collection since some
portion of child support would be paid without the enhanced bureaucracy. See VCiC
TURETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, CHILD SUPPORT TRENDS PRESENTATION ON
POWERPOINT, http://www.clasp.org/publications/cstrends-0503.ppt (last visited Sept.
4, 2005) (finding that the federal child support program has not paid for itself since
1988 and the gap between program costs and revenues is widening).
219 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
220 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
221 Prior to 1996 and PRWORA, the federal government required that the first
fifty dollars of child support collected on time each month was to be passed through
to the family. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 102, 102 Stat. 2343,
2346; see also TERESA A. MYERS, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD SUP-
PORT PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE CHILD SUPPORT PAss-THROUGH PROGRAMS, available
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/csissue.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004) (ex-
plaining the federal government's child support reform legislation, including the
elimination of the pass-through requirement and its effect). Even this modest benefit
to welfare families was repealed under PRWORA. While the states may (but are not
required to) provide a pass-through of any amount they wish, it will not be financed
by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1) (B) (2000). The funding must
come from the state's portion of collected support. The majority of the states (thirty)
no longer pass through any amount of the child support collection. PAULA ROBERTS
& MICHELLE VINSON, CTR. FOR LAw & Soc. POLICY, STATE POLICY REGARDING PASS-
THROUGH AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMI-
LIES RECEIVING TANF-FUNDED CASH ASSISTANCE (2004), available at http://www.clasp.
org/publications/pass-thru3pdf (listing all 50 states and the District of Columbia's
child support pass-through and income disregard policies as of August 31, 2004).
222 See supra notes 83-88, 109-10 and accompanying text.
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their father hurts those children in a variety of ways. Studies have
long suggested that fathers are more willing to pay child support if
they know their money is actually going to the children.223 And fa-
thers who are able to pay child support and do so tend to be more
active in their children's lives. 22 4 In addition, even modest pass-
through payments can assist low-income families for whom child sup-
port may constitute about twenty-five percent of the average family
income.2 25 Finally, eliminating the pass through may have an adverse
impact on reducing welfare costs. Those states that have opted for
generous pass throughs have increased both the number of families
leaving welfare and the amount of child support collected.226
The cooperation requirement is also harmful to low-income fami-
lies. First, the process of meeting the cooperation requirement is, at
best, intrusive and demeaning for custodial mothers. In some circum-
stances, it may also place mothers at grave risk of harm when putative
fathers retaliate with intimidation, threats, and violence after being
identified.2 27 While there is a good cause exception for victims of do-
223 Participants [in the Common Ground Project] agreed that [assignment of
support to the state] is one of the most alienating features of the current
[welfare] system: that many of the children most in need, those receiving
public assistance, receive nothing from the fathers who may be struggling
the hardest to pay child support.
FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 10; see Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 197 (1999).
224 In 1999, seventy-nine percent of children born out of wedlock who had a child
support order and received payments saw their father in the previous year, whereas
only forty-three percent of children who had no child support order and received no
payments saw their father in the previous year. HEATHER KOBALL & DESIREE PRINCIPE,
URBAN INST., Do NONRESIDENT FATHERS WHO PAY CHILD SUPPORT VISIT THEIR CHIL-
DREN MORE? 4 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310438.pdf.
In 2001, 85.3% of custodial parents with child support orders had joint custody or
visitation agreements with the noncustodial parent. Of these, 77.1% of the noncus-
todial parents received some support payments. For those noncustodial parents with-
out joint custody or visitation agreements, 55.8% received any child support
payments. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FA-
THERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2001, at 8 (2003), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-225.pdf.
225 Enhance Child Support Enforcement Overview, FDCH Federal Department and Agency
Documents, REG. INTELLIGENCE DATA, Feb. 26, 2002 (LEXIS, News Library, Allnews
File).
226 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 1999 REPORT TO CONGRESS: ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON WELFARE RECIDIVISM OF
PRWORA CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS DISTRIBUTION POLICY CHANGES (1999), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/1999rpt/1999report.htm.
227 The PRWORA permits "good cause" and "other exceptions" to the coopera-
tion requirement in situations when an exception would be "in the best interests of
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mestic violence to the cooperation requirement, 228 states have wide
discretion in implementing this exception. This discretion creates the
potential that a state will limit the availability of this exception "to
remove the difficult cases from their welfare rolls." 229 Its effectiveness
has also been limited because women "either did not know of its exis-
tence or could not verify their status as victims of abuse." 230
Even where the relationship between the mother and father is
not violent, the requirement that mothers cooperate and participate
in child support enforcement proceedings to recoup money for the
state hurts those relationships. Young unmarried mothers and fathers
may live apart but forge some bond based on mutual love of their
children and function without extensive acrimony prior to state in-
volvement. Being forced into repeated court appearances with
mother as plaintiff (although the state initiated the case) and father as
defendant undermines relationships in these fragile families. State in-
volvement often includes contempt actions where the father is
brought into court with the threat of incarceration. The mother's
name on the case may make it look like she instigated the case,
though she actually has no control in the decision to begin a con-
tempt action and is often not informed about the action until she,
too, receives a summons.231 Forcing an adversarial proceeding be-
tween unmarried parents may also trigger counter demands for cus-
the child." 42 U.S.C. § 654(29) (A) (2000) (corresponds to PRWORA, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 333, 110 Stat. 2105, 2230-31 (1996)). Federal regulations define good
cause as a situation where, among other things, identification would lead to physical
and emotional harm to the child or caretaker. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.42(a), 303.5(b)
(2004).
228 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.42(a), 303.5(b).
229 Paul K. Legler, The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Child Support Enforcement Sys-
tem, in CHILD SuPPowr: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 128, at 46, 57; see also Shelby
A.D. Moore, Understanding the Connection Between Domestic Violence, Crime, and Poverty:
How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women from Leaving Abusive Relationships, 12 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 451, 480 (2003) (arguing that states are encouraged to compete with
each other by moving recipients off of welfare).
230 Moore, supra note 229, at 477; see also Mark Matthew Graham, Domestic Violence
Victims and Welfare "Reform": The Family Violence Option in Illinois, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 433, 450 (2002) (discussing the burdens placed on battered women by the coop-
eration requirement); Naomi Stern, Battered by the System: How Advocates Against Domes-
tic Violence Have Improved Victims' Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 56-57 (2003) (arguing that many battered women who are welfare
recipients are not aware of the "good cause" option and few good cause claims have
been filed).
231 Interview with Daniel Hatcher, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Bait. Sch. of Law,
in Bait., Md. (Dec. 13, 2004) (notes on file with author).
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tody from the father, leaving mothers vulnerable in a process in which
their interests are not represented by the state. 232
Most troubling in the context of paternity disestablishment, the
cooperation requirement may also encourage identification of men
who have neither a biological connection nor a desire to become the
child's psychological father. Both the pressure imposed by making
financial support dependent upon identification and the informality
of the setting in which these identifications are made lead to paternity
establishments that are later challenged when serious child support
enforcement begins.2s3
Thus, the link between welfare and child support does little to
benefit the state and can hurt families. This central tenet of welfare
policy should be reexamined in light of its often devastating impact
on poor families.
B. Refining the Current System
Eliminating the compulsory assignment and cooperation require-
ments from federal child support law could do much to reduce the
number of paternity disestablishments that lead to fatherless chil-
dren.2 34 But even if such sweeping change is not feasible at this time,
more modest modifications to the current framework can help to
avoid the chain of unintended consequences described in this Article.
These proposals focus on three critical points in the child support
232 Paula Roberts & Michael Allen, An AFDC Mother's Right to Counsel: Custody Issues
in Proceedings Instigated by the IV-D Agency, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 278, 278 (1985).
233 See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. "Our system kind of encour-
ages [paternity identification and future contests] . . . . In order for a mother to
collect AFDC . . . she has to name someone for the office of child support enforce-
ment to go after .... [Naming the father] is done under pressure, and without the
formality that would encourage truthtelling." Langston v. Rifle, 754 A.2d 389, 405
n.15 (Md. 2000) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Jane Bowling, Forcing Paternity in the Name of Finality and Expediency, DALY
REc. (Md.), Nov. 12, 1994 (quoting Jane C. Murphy, Professor of Law, Univ. of Balt.
Sch. of Law)).
234 While such a change would require a major rethinking of welfare policy, it
could be achieved without changing the work and time limitations that were central
to PRWORA and welfare reform in the 1990s. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (A) (iii) (West
2003 & Supp. 2005). Without conceding the value or viability of these limitations on
welfare, they could be maintained as part of the conditions for welfare receipt without
requiring the recipient to identify the father or assign her rights to support to the
state.
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process: paternity establishment, child support establishment, and pa-
ternity disestablishment.23 5
1. Paternity Establishment
An obvious solution to the problem of paternity disestablishments
is to require genetic testing in all cases before legal recognition of
paternity. 23 6 More genetic testing would certainly reduce the number
of later paternity disestablishments. But mandatory testing presents a
number of problems. First, the obvious problem with such an ap-
proach is cost. Even though the costs of such testing have come down
significantly in the last decade,23 7 the average cost for court approved
laboratories is still at least $200.2-s Imposing such costs on parties or
the state for all paternity establishments-voluntary and contested-
would significantly undermine the goal of obtaining child support or-
ders for as many children as possible.
A genetic testing requirement might also present noneconomic
obstacles to the goal of having fathers in as many children's lives as
possible. Practitioners in the field report that an undetermined but
substantial number of fathers who acknowledge or consent to pater-
nity do so having doubts that they are biologically related to the chil-
dren who are the subject of the paternity establishment.299 While
some of these fathers will later seek to disestablish paternity,240 many
will not. Those that do not seek disestablishment have stayed because
of a bond with the child's mother or with the child or with both.2 41
Many children, who might otherwise be fatherless, will get fathers
235 Many of the proposals discussed in this Article come from the Common
Ground Project. This innovative project, a collaboration of the National Women's
Law Center and Center for Fathers, Families, and Public Policy, is an effort to develop
areas of consensus between low-income mothers and fathers to "develop and advance
public policy recommendations on child support and interrelated welfare and family
law issues that promote effective co-parenting relationships and ensure emotional and
financial support for children." DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 169, at 1.
236 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 183, at 42; Louis J. Tesser, Dad or Duped? Post-
Appeal Challenges to Paternity judgments Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Marital Chil-
dren, FAM. ADVOc., Fall 2002, at 29.
237 See supra note 183.
238 FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 19.
239 Telephone Interview with Martin J. McGuire, Assistant State's Attorney, Chief,
Support Enforcement Unit (Jan. 10, 2005) (notes on file with author).
240 Some state statutes prohibit paternity disestablishment when the father con-
sents to paternity knowing he was not the biological father. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 5-1038(a) (2) (ii) (LexisNexis 2004). In practice, however, it is difficult to
prove prior knowledge to prevent a disestablishment.
241 Telephone Interview with Martin J. McGuire, supra note 239.
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through this process. If genetic testing were required in all cases,
many child support professionals believe these "volunteer" fathers
would opt-out after they are confronted with the test that removes any
doubt about the lack of a genetic link with their children. 242 As a
result, many potentially strong families would never be formed.
Rather than require testing in all cases, testing should be en-
couraged in a number of ways. First, more resources must be devoted
to giving putative fathers the verbal and written legal information re-
quired by federal law about the consequences of acknowledging or
consenting to paternity.2 43 Ideally, this information should be ex-
plained before consents are obtained, by lawyers, or, at a minimum,
by informed lay staff present at paternity acknowledgment sites. The
Common Ground Project has proposed a series of reforms to provide
both better written materials and more informed and accessible staff
in locations where paternity acknowledgments are made.244 The use
of these improved resources should help ensure that more putative
fathers undergo genetic testing before acknowledging paternity, and
that those who choose to forgo such testing do so knowingly and
voluntarily.
In addition to educating putative fathers about their legal rights
and obligations, the government should waive the costs of testing in
all cases where testing is requested by the parties. Federal law cur-
rently requires the child support agency to advance the cost of the test
if there is a financial need.2 45 But costs can be assessed later against
putative fathers who deny paternity and are not excluded by the
test.246 Waiving costs of all tests for low-income litigants regardless of
242 Id.
243 See supra notes 159-60.
244 FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 16-18, 24-25. Some experts have argued that
the state would do a better job of informing putative fathers of the implications of
consenting to paternity if the federal system of incentives for paternity establishment
was tied to the accuracy of paternity establishment, not just the number of such or-
ders. Interview with Daniel Hatcher, supra note 231.
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (B) (ii) (I) (2000); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1981) (finding that a state's failure to advance the costs of blood testing for an
indigent paternity defendant violated due process).
246 FAMILY TIES, supra note 151, at 19. Despite the federal protection, some child
support agencies routinely require prepayment for testing. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Gri-
ner, 843 A.2d 887, 888, 890 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (vacating the lower court's
order denying waiver of prepayment for a putative father claiming indigency and re-
manding for a determination of whether "'the cost of... genetic test[ing] shall be
borne by the county where the proceeding is pending"') (quoting MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 5-1029(h) (2) (LexisNexis 2004)); MAM v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 99
P.3d 982 (Wyo. 2004) (permitting legal father to reopen paternity judgment because,
among other things, the court record did not. establish that the man had been in-
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result will result in greater "up front" costs for the state. But learning
that the putative father is not the biological father at this early stage
will avoid forfeiture of arrearages for those who later seek paternity
disestablishment. In addition, getting this information at the time of
establishment will provide an opportunity to determine whether a
good cause exception exists to excuse the custodial mother from iden-
tifying the biological father, and will provide the opportunity to inves-
tigate alternative putative fathers at a point when there is still a
possibility of identifying another man as the biological father. Most
importantly, it will avoid the trauma of paternity disestablishment for
the children when they are older.
2. Child Support Establishment and Modification
A variety of reforms can be made to the current child support
establishment and modification process to strike a balance between
effective child support enforcement and fair treatment of low-income
obligors. As a guiding principle for reforms at this stage, federal and
state law should seek to "develop targeted, specific initiatives" to deal
with the problems faced by the "special population[ ]" of low-income
obligors.247 These reforms should not signal a retreat from the rule-
based formula approach to child support and a return to the discre-
tionary approach that yielded low awards and inconsistent treatment
even among families with the same income. 248 Rather, these refine-
ments recognize the particular burdens the current system places on
low-income obligors and should reduce the number of legal fathers
who now view paternity disestablishment as the only defense against
aggressive child support sanctions.
The first point of reform in the development of child support
orders is to develop procedures that facilitate obligor participation.
Under current procedures, child support orders are routinely entered
without actual notice and participation by the noncustodial parent. 24 -
formed of his right to genetic testing). Attorneys in the field report that state child
support workers and judges only provide information about where to get tests and
how much they cost and routinely fail to advise putative fathers that paternity testing
fees can be waived. Interview with Daniel Hatcher, supra note 231.
247 Policy Briefing, Ctr. For Fam. Policy and Practice, OCSE Releases 2005-2009
Strategic Plan for Child Support Enforcement 1 (2004) [hereinafter Policy Briefing],
http://www.cffpp.org/briefings/pdfs/brief_0410.pdf (describing the United States
Office of Child Support Enforcement's (OCES) 2005-2009 Strategic Plan for Child Sup-
port Enforcement).
248 For a critique of the pre-guideline approach to child support establishment,
see Murphy, supra note 22.
249 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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Where support is set by administrative agencies rather than courts,
service may be done by first-class mail rather than personal service and
hearings may be dispensed with entirely.250 Even where support is set
in a judicial process, unrepresented obligors, not understanding the
significance of the notice to appear, frequently do not attend hear-
ings.251 There is, therefore, a high likelihood that support orders will
be set by default order without income information and other input
from the obligor. Given these circumstances, states should develop
easy-to-use procedures for obligors to obtain relief to adjust the orders
quickly so substantial arrearages do not accrue. A few states have ex-
perimented with making child support orders set by "provisional or
temporary [orders] to permit changes if the noncustodial parent ap-
pears and provides actual income information. 2 52 Alternatively,
some states have extended the time for modifying or vacating default
orders to permit obligor input.253
Once the obligor is before the court or agency, the guidelines
used to determine the amount of the support order need to be re-
structured to avoid unrealistically high orders. While the needs of
low-income fathers must always be balanced against the needs of cus-
todial mothers and children, 54 finding the right mix of incentives
and sanctions is challenging at best. A variety of proposals have
emerged from the American Law Institute,255 the Common Ground
Project 25 6 and others257 that create the potential for greater fairness
250 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 41. The OCSE's 2005-2009 Strategic Plan in-
cludes proposals to increase the use of "expedited and administrative processes." OF-
FICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 12 [hereinafter STRATEGIC
PLAN], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/StrategicPlan
Y2005-2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). Such plans include "recourse to courts
to ensure that parents perceive procedural justice." Id. The lack of legal advice and
representation to file appeals and appear in court, however, certainly weakens any
assurance of procedural fairness. See supra note 159.
251 See supra note 159; see also Paula Roberts, If You Don't Know There's a Problem,
How Can You Find a Solution?: The Need for Notice and Hearing Rights in Child Support
Distribution Cases, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 422 (2002) (analyzing notice and hearing
issues).
252 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 41.
253 Id. at 40-41.
254 Of course, under the current assignment policies, support for children on wel-
fare will go to the state and any policies that reduce the support order will not affect
the children. However, to the extent some states permit pass-through support or fam-
ilies are forced or choose to leave welfare, the level of support orders of low-income
fathers will have an impact on their children.
255 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 65, § 3.01-.05.
256 DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 169, at 37.
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in child support orders for low-income obligors. While the proposals
vary in their details, all include adjustments to minimize the unjust
results for low-income obligors from the marginal expenditure ap-
proach of the Income Shares Guideline. 258 For example, when deter-
mining the obligor's financial capability, guidelines should be
structured to include an adjustment to the mandated support amount
to create an adequate "self-support reserve" for the obligor's basic liv-
ing expenses. 259 Other proposals critique the use of "presumptive
minimum orders."2 60 These support orders, typically from twenty to
fifty dollars per month but may run higher, authorize courts and
agencies to order support even where the obligor has no income. 26'
Such orders may be appropriate where the obligor has "the realistic
capability of making a current financial contribution. '262 Where no
such capability exists because of chronic unemployment or part time
or seasonal employment, the courts should not order support. In-
stead, courts should set regular reviews and require these fathers to
participate in job training, parenting classes, and, if applicable, sub-
stance abuse programs to assist them in meeting their support
obligations.2 63
257 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 13.
258 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 84, at 735.
259 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 11. Some states have included such an adjust-
ment in their guidelines but these often fall short of assuring obligor minimum living
expenses because the reserve set aside is "considerably below the federal poverty level
for one person." Id.; see also Grace Ganz Blumberg, Balancing the Interests: The Ameri-
can Law Institute's Treatment of Child Support, 33 FAM. L.Q. 39, 44-45 (1999) (discussing
the American Law Institute's child support formula).
260 DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 169, at 11.
261 Id. at 12.
262 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 26. Some experts suggested that minimum
awards should not be imposed unless the obligor's income is at least at or above fifty
percent of the federal poverty level. DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 169, at 13.
263 CASEY STUDY, supra note 127, at 55 n.9 (describing Partners for Fragile Families
as "a ten site demonstration project in which faith-based and community-based re-
sponsible fatherhood programs are working together with welfare, workforce develop-
ment, and child support agencies to assist young, low-income, unwed parents: 1)
establish paternity, 2) increase their financial ability to pay support, and 3) work to-
gether in raising their children"); see also Joe Lambe, First-of-its-kind Program Getting
Results and Kudos, KAN. CI' STAR, Jan. 11, 2005, at BI (describing Missouri program
that allows noncustodial fathers facing long term unemployment, substance abuse,
and other barriers to child support compliance, an opportunity to participate in a
program providing job training, parenting classes, and substance abuse treatment as
an alternative to incarceration and other sanctions); Jennifer McMenamin, Jobs Pro-
gram Aimed at Helping Parents Make Child Support Payments, BALT. SUN, Dec. 27, 2004, at
BI (describing Baltimore area court-based pilot program that "pairs chronic un-
derpayers" of child support with employment coordinator for weekly meetings to as-
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Refinements in the law also need to be made to address the sub-
stantial numbers of low-income obligors who are currently subject to
unrealistically high orders and are facing sanctions for mounting ar-
rearages.264 For example, federal law should be strengthened to en-
courage states to forgive arrearages when they are owed to the state
and where the obligor's income is at or near poverty level. While cur-
rent federal policy permits states to forgive arrearages in limited
cases, 265 states have done little to develop arrearage forgiveness poli-
cies to assist low-income fathers. 266 Child support agencies should
also be more prudent in seeking sanctions. For example, instead of
automatic revocation of all licenses when support is overdue, agencies
should consider permitting work-restricted licenses where the obli-
gor's income is dependent on a professional or motor vehicle license.
For the same reasons, when incarceration is used as a sanction for
failure to pay child support, the sentence should include work release
when it will facilitate the payment of child support.
And, as recommended at almost every point in this process, ade-
quate resources must be devoted to provide greater access to legal
representation or pro se assistance for timely intervention for those
with legitimate bases for reducing or terminating child support-e.g.,
fathers who are incarcerated, disabled, or who have assumed informal
sist in job search and monitor child support payments); Libby Sander, Judge's Proposal
Gives Fathers Another Option, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 21, 2003, at 3 (describing Family
Court judge's proposal to permit fathers who owe child support to participate in par-
ent education and job training as an alternative to incarceration).
264 See supra note 176.
265 The Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement has developed a policy in-
tended to permit states to develop standards to guide courts to exercise discretion to
forgive state-owed arrearages in appropriate circumstances. Memorandum from
David Gray Ross, Comm'r, Office of Child Support Enhancement, to IV-D Dirs. (Mar.
22, 1999), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/PIQ/piq-9903.
htm.
266 See, e.g., Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 174, at 10-11 (describing the Mary-
land Child Support Enforcement Administration's consistent refusal to grant the Le-
gal Aid Bureau's "requests for forgiveness of state-owed arrearages on behalf of
obligors who are reunited with their children" despite the existence of a pilot project
in Baltimore to encourage forgiveness of arrearages with participation in counseling
and job skills programs); see also Harvey v. Marshall, No. 109, 2005 WL 2573357 (Md.
Oct. 14, 2005) (upholding the intermediate appellate court's refusal to set aside ar-
rearages owed to the state for a father who had assumed care of his four children).
There are hopeful signs from the 2005-2009 OCSE Strategic Plan which includes
among its strategies for the coming years: "Leverage debt, relieving uncollectible debt
owed to the State, or [to the custodial parent (obligee)] with obligee's permission, in
return for regular, reliable payment of current support." STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
250, at 10; Policy Briefing, supra note 247.
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custody of children.2 67 Poverty legal assistance programs should also
consider redirecting resources to systemic reform for low-income non-
custodial fathers, a group that has not been the traditional beneficiary
of resources of such programs.2 68
C. Paternity Disestablishment
Perhaps the most complex challenge for reform in this area is the
development of sound policies for paternity disestablishment. A num-
ber of competing interests are present in many situations in which a
legal father who is not the biological father seeks to disestablish pater-
nity.2 69 The factual circumstances underlying these disestablishment
cases are many and varied. The mothers may have identified a nonbi-
ological father for "good" reasons-to get needed public benefits for
her children while avoiding the threat of harm from the child's abu-
sive biological father.270 Or she may have identified a nonbiological
father under less sympathetic circumstances. She may have had multi-
ple partners and been unsure about the paternity of the child, or she
may have identified a putative father to solidify her relationship with
267 Although the need for legal representation for family law litigants continues to
far exceed the supply, pro se assistance programs have developed around the country
in response to the lack of affordable legal representation in family law disputes, even
for those who qualify for free legal assistance. See, e.g., Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for
Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORD1HAM L.
REV. 1573 (2001). Where these pro se assistance projects exist, noncustodial fathers
are frequent users of the services. An evaluation of three pro se programs in Califor-
nia indicated that in Los Angeles County, 38,521 individuals utilized the pro se pro-
gram in fiscal year 2001-2002. Paternity cases make up twenty-seven percent of the
caseload (the second largest category of cases). In all three programs combined,
child support cases make up twenty-one percent of the requests for assistance. Over-
all, fifty-eight percent of the individuals requesting assistance were women and forty-
two percent men. In Los Angeles County, fifty-five percent of clients were women and
forty-five percent men. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, A
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-FAMILY LAW INFORMATION CENTERS.: AN
EVALUATION OF THREE PILOT PROGRAMS 26-27, 39-40 (2003), available at http://www.
courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/FLIC-full.pdf.
268 Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 174, at 6 (describing a pilot project devel-
oped by the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau focused on the needs of low-income fathers
by providing assistance in addressing barriers to sustained employment and economic
stability as a result of child support problems or policies).
269 One court identified three entities with interests implicated in paternity deter-
minations: "the child, the putative parent, and the State." In re Marriage of Wendy
M., 962 P.2d 130, 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). I would add the mother to that list, as
someone who has at least as great an interest as the father and the state in these
matters.
270 See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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him because of a strong emotional, financial, or other bond with him.
Nonbiological fathers, too, consent to paternity for a variety of rea-
sons, some engendering more sympathy than others. The putative fa-
ther may indeed be a "duped dad"271 who was misled by a partner into
believing he was the biological father and consented to paternity to
meet his legal and emotional obligations to the child. Or he may have
known he was not the biological father or had doubts but wanted to
solidify his relationship with the mother, child, or both, regardless of
genetic link.2 72 Or he may have anticipated benefiting from the wel-
fare payments that followed paternity establishment, unaware of the
child support obligations he would face as a consequence.
Whatever the circumstances, both adults share some responsibil-
ity for the troubling circumstances in which they and their child find
themselves if years later the father seeks to disestablish paternity. Re-
gardless of their motivations, the mother's actions in identifying the
putative father and the father's actions in consenting to paternity
without genetic testing may have a number of adverse consequences
for the child. Their actions have prevented further efforts to identify
the biological father and, in many instances, have resulted in the for-
mation of an emotional and/or financial bond between the legal fa-
ther and the child. The only truly innocent victim in these cases is the
child. Given that, any policy solution must resolve competing inter-
ests in favor of the child. Like most sound family regulation, the
strongest approaches include clearly defined rules with some limited
discretion.
1. Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations which provides a clean "cut off' for claims
of paternity disestablishment has the virtue of certainty, predictability,
and simplicity. Putative fathers can be easily informed about their
rights to challenge a paternity determination and custodial mothers
know when a paternity acknowledgment or order will be permanent.
When combined with social science research on child development,
such an approach also contributes to decisions that are in the best
interests of the children.
271 Kathy Boccella, Men Seek 'Paternity Fraud' Law: Many Must Pay Support for Chil-
dren Who Aren't Theirs, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 2003, at AI; Alex Tresniowski, Dads by
Default: Forced To Help Support Three Sons He Did Not Father, Morgan Wise Speaks Out on
Behalf of Other Deceived Dads, PEOPLE WKLY., Nov. 25, 2002, at 78.
272 Although the claim that the father consented to paternity knowing he was not
the father is often a defense under state law, in practice it is unlikely to successfully
bar disestablishment. See supra note 240.
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Two issues that must be resolved in developing a child focused
statute of limitations are (1) the point in time that triggers the statute
and (2) the appropriate length of time for the statute of limitations.
Some statutes run from the time of the child's birth and others run
from the time the father learns of the "fraud" that led to his status as
legal father. If the statute of limitations is tolled until the father al-
leges he learned of the "fraud," the proceeding may be brought long
after a strong bond with the child has formed.2 73 If the child's inter-
est is to take precedence over fairness to fathers, the time limit should
run from the child's birth.
In deciding the number of years for the statute of limitations,
states that have such statutes vary in length from one year274 to five
years.2 75 While the time within which a father and child will bond
varies with the frequency of contact and the temperaments of the par-
ties involved, most child development specialists feel that with at least
minimal contact between father and child, this bond forms within the
first two years of the child's life.27 6 Thus, a statute of limitations that
protects children from the possibility of genetic testing and potential
disestablishment after the child reaches the age of two is best suited to
protect the child's interests. While most existing statutes of limita-
tions are triggered by the legal father's discovery, this is the approach
followed under the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000277 and has been
273 Although state law often regulates when tests can be ordered and admitted
into evidence, the wide availability of genetic testing kits makes testing without either
a court order or the custodial parent's permission possible. See supra note 183.
274 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (Supp. 2005) (enforcing one-year time limita-
tion strictly unless the child is born more than 300 days after the parents are legally
separated).
275 ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (2004) (providing a three-year statute of limitations
from the date of child's birth or the time the putative father knew or should have
known of paternity); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-107(1) (b) (2005) (stating that action
must be brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts,
but no later than five years after the child's birth).
276 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt. (2002) (finding that allowing such paternity
actions after the child's second birthday will have severe consequences for the child);
see also Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research To Make
Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REv. 297, 298, 304 (2000) (suggesting that children develop attachments to parents
and caregivers during the first year of life and that the loss of a significant relationship
can cause anxiety and a sense of loss). The child's bond to the father can occur even
without frequent contact and even where the father does not reciprocate. See Tran-
script of Record at 8-10, Gantt v. Sanchez, No. PD 60-104431 (Md. Cir. Ct. Bait. City
Nov. 8, 1999) (testimony of Dr. Leon Rosenberg) (on file with author).
277 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(a) (2002).
20051
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
adopted in a handful of states.278 The only exception to the bar
should be in situations (1) where the biological father has been identi-
fied, and (2) he has established a relationship with the child that is
stronger than that of the legal father.
Imposing a uniform statute of limitations with such a limited ex-
ception will result in requiring greater numbers of nonbiological so-
cial fathers to remain legal fathers. But legal recognition of such
fathers is consistent with the sound child-centered policies that are
developing in the custody area279 and should have equal application
in paternity decisions.
2. Best Interests Test
Even where the request to disestablish paternity is made within
the statute of limitations, all decisions concerning paternity disestab-
lishment should be made under a "best interests of the child" stan-
dard. A custodial parent's decisions on behalf of her child are often
presumed to be in the child's best interests. 280 There are, however, a
number of circumstances in paternity contests in which the custodial
mother may support the legal father's request for paternity disestab-
lishment regardless of the interests of the child. Even if she believes
the legal father is the biological father, she may not be interested in
any support from him. She has supported the child herself without
any help from the legal father or is not likely to receive his support
because of the father's poverty or the welfare assignment rules or
both. In other cases where there is genuine doubt as to the legal fa-
ther's biological link, she may agree it is only fair to let the legal father
"off the hook." Or she may believe the legal father voluntarily became
the psychological father to the child, but the legal father may have
intimidated or regularly harassed the mother about "setting the re-
cord straight." The mother may acquiesce under pressure from the
legal father or because she feels that she and her child would be bet-
ter off without the negative presence of the legal father. Thus, courts
should not "rubber stamp" a mother's acquiescence in a request but
should make an independent determination as to whether a paternity
disestablishment is in the best interests of the child.281
278 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575 (a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3 (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.305 (West 2005).
279 See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
280 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
281 Given the potentially conflicting interests of the parents and child in paternity
cases, a provision requiring separate counsel to guide the court in its best interests
analysis may be needed. The UPA's model statute contains such a provision. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 612 (2002); see alsoJane C. Murphy & Cheri Wyron Levin, When
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While some states have adopted the best interests approach, 28 2
many have not.2 8 3 And even those that have adopted the standard
have not applied it with any consistency, often articulating the stan-
dard but giving greater deference to fairness for fathers.28 4 Thus,
courts need specific factors to assist them in applying the best interest
standard in paternity disestablishment cases.
Factors that should guide the court in this context include
examining
1. the past relationship and existing bond between the child and
the legal father;
2. whether there is an existing relationship with another de facto or
biological father or the potential to create such a relationship;
3. thie child's current physical and emotional needs; and
4. the child's need to ascertain genetic information for the purpose
of medical treatment or genealogical history.
28 5
Applying such factors will assist courts in resolving paternity disestab-
lishment cases in a way that appropriately places the child's interests
above the state's and the parents' interests.
Daddy Wants Out: The Issue of Paternity, 33 MD. BAR J., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 10 (2000)
(discussing the need for separate representation of children in paternity modification
proceedings).
282 See, e.g., State ex rel. J.A.U., 47 P.3d 327, 333 (Colo. 2002); Baker v. Baker, 582
S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ga. 2003); Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841, 844 (Kan. Ct. App.
2000); In re Paternity of Adam, 903 P.2d 207, 211 (Mont. 1995); Crago v. Kinzie, 733
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ohio 2000); In re Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1997);
McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 261 (Wash. 1987); In re Marriage of Wendy M.,
962 P.2d 130, 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630,
639 (Wis. 2004).
283 See supra notes 187-88.
284 Cochran v. Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that cor-
rectly identifying parents and offspring is a more important policy consideration than
the best interests of the child); Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003)
(noting that "it would have been unjust and unfair to require [the legal father] to
continue paying child support," the court set aside paternity because it was in the ten-
year-old child's best interests to know the identity of his biological father).
285 Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. 1992). While Maryland courts have
approved a best-interest standard in the context of a request to reopen paternity
where the mother of the child was married, it has not applied this standard in cases
where the mother is unmarried. Compare Langston v. Rifle, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000)
(holding that blood or genetic tests are available, upon motion, to any putative father
seeking to challenge a prior paternity declaration), with Stubbs v. Calendra, 841 A.2d
361 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that ordering a blood test to determine paternity would not be in
the child's best interest).
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CONCLUSION
State and federal child support and welfare policies that aggres-
sively encourage paternity establishment and focus enforcement ef-
forts on low-income fathers have contributed to a new definition of
fatherhood based exclusively on biology and economic support. This
definition hurts the state, low-income families, and, most especially,
children. Legal fathers may be willing to maintain a formal connec-
tion with children who are at risk of becoming fatherless. But current
child support policies that privilege the economic function of father-
hood above all others do not permit functional fathers to assume
emotional and caretaking responsibilities without assuming full finan-
cial responsibilities under a child support regime that hurts low-in-
come fathers. Legal fathers, particularly low-income obligors, must
often choose between irreparably harming a child they have called
their own for many years or facing financial ruin.
The legal definition of fatherhood must be broad and flexible
enough to resolve paternity conflicts in ways that stabilize families and
protect children. This requires rethinking the current welfare and
child systems to develop policies that discourage uninformed pater-
nity consents on the front end. And, if challenges to paternity are
permitted, legislatures and courts need to define fatherhood broadly
enough so that decisions about paternity disestablishment are
grounded in the child's best interest at the backend. In addition,
while rigorous child support enforcement policies are essential to
middle- and upper-income custodial parents and children, the appli-
cation of these policies to low-income, fragile families must be reex-
amined to discourage functional fathers from seeking paternity
disestablishment. Creating a legal definition of fatherhood to account
for the complexity of modern families is a difficult task but one that
must have as its goal protecting children and preventing the loss of
fathers in their lives.
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